Reference and belief : some problems and theories by Cobetto, Jack Bernard
REFERENCE AND BELIEF:
SOME PROBLEMS AND THEORIES
by
JACK BERNARD COBETTO
A.B., Yale University
1978
SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF LINGUISTICS
AND PHILOSOPHY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in
PHILOSOPHY
at the
~~SSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
June 1985
@) Jack Bernard Cobetto 1985
The author hereby grants to M.I.T. permission to reproduce
and to distribute publicly copies of this thesis document
in whole or in part.
Signature of Author
-----Department of Linguistics and Philosophy
April 30, 1985
Certified by
---------- Richard L~rtwright
rphoc; ~ ~1,na,...,.r;C!r\r
L
- . gc- v. I"
Rlchard Cartwr1ght
Chair, Department
Graduate Committee
Accepted by
-----------------.--~~~---_J#_~~
REFERENCE AND BELIEF:
SOME PROBLEMS AND THEORIES
by
JACK BERNARD COBETTO
Submitted to the Department of Linguistics and
Philosophy on April 30, 1985, in partial ful-
fillment of the requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy.
ABSTRACT
In Part One, I offer and defend a solution to Saul
Kripke's puzzle about belief. I also consider and reject
some of the general claims that Kripke makes regarding the
philosophical significance of the puzzle. Finally, I examine
and evaluate some of the solutions to the puzzle that have
been proposed by other philosophers.
In an appendix to Part One, I discuss Kripke's argument
that purports to establish that proper names are not synony-
mous with the definite descriptions with which they are com-
monly associated. I present another argument for this con-
clusion, and show that my argument is not open to several
objections that have been raised against Kripke's.
In Part Two, I consider questions like "IIow is the
reference of a proper name determined?" and "How do we
manage to use proper names to refer to things?U I argue
that although these questions are considered the central
questions to which any theory of reference must respond, they
have not been given a clear sense. I consider several pos-
sible interpretations and show that they are all unacceptable
because they do not allow us to regard the various prominent
theories of reference, such as the causal and description
theories, as offering initially plausible but conflicting
responses to these questions.
Thesis Supervisor: Richard Cartwright
Professor of Philosophy
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PART ONE:
Kripke's Belief Paradox
5
IIn his article, "A Puzzle about Belief u , Saul Kripke
argues that philosophers are not justified in rejecting the
principle of sUbstitutivity of coreferential
He says,
1proper names.
When we enter into the area exemplified by Jones
and Pierre, we enter into an area where our normal
practices of interpretation and attribution of
belief are subjected to the greatest possible
strain, perhaps to the point of breakdown. So is
the notion of the content of someone's assertion,
the proposition it expresses. In the present
state of our knowledge, I think it would be
foolish to draw any conclllsion posi tive or negative,
about sUbstitutivity.2
Central to ..i{ripke' s argument for these claims is the now
famous puzzle about Pierre. In this paper, I will offer
and defend a solution to Kripke's puzzle. In addition, I
will discuss some of the conclusions that Kripke and others
have inferred from Pierre's predicament.
Let me begin with a short discussion of the background
of the present debate concerning substitutivity. Kripke has
argued that names are not 'synonymous with "associated ll def-
inite descriptions.) Na~~s are " r igid" designators, whereas
their "associated" definite descriptions typically are not.
Some have taken this to entail that names do not have any
"meaning" or "sense" at all. These philosophers have argued
that if proper names do not have any "meaning" or "sense"
then their only "semantic function" is to refer to whatever
they denote. But if this is so, it is argued, then someone
6
7who says "Cicero =Cicero" would be "making the same statement"
or "expressing the same proposition ll as someone who says
"Cicero = Tully.," since "Cicero" and IITully" refer to the
same person. After all, how could they be making different
statements? The only difference between the two utterances,
it appears, is that one person used the name "Cicero" and the
other used the name "Tully.1I But if the only "semantic
function ll of a name is to refer to its denotation, it would
seem that there can not be any "semantic difference" between
the two utterances. The two people must have "asserted th~
same proposition." The notion of the IIsemantic function" of
a proper name is not clear, and I will discuss at length
later· on what is meant by" expressing the 52.me proposition"
and "making the same statement" and other equally familiar
expressions. However, the above formulation of the argument
is fairly well known and is adequate for my present purposes.
Many philosophers have argued that the conclusion to
the above argument is clearly false. Obviously, it is
argued, someone who utters (1) is making a different state-
ment or expressing a different proposition than a person who
utters (2).
(1) Cicero = Cicero.
(2) Cicero = Tully.
But if it does follow from the supposition that names are
rigid designators that people who utter (1) express the same
8proposition as those who utter (2), then if they are not in
fact exp=essing the same propositinn, it follows that names
are not rigid designators. Again, this argument is fairly
well known. It seems that Kripke is left with a choice of
rejecting one of the argument's assumptions. Either it doesn't
follow from the assumption that names are rigid designators
that a person who utters (1) asserts the same proposition as
one who utters (2), or the two people actually do express the
same proposition~ In IIA Puzzle about Belief," Kripke argues
that the most common argument used by philosophers to estab-
lish that (1). and (2) express different propositions is no
good.
That argument goes as follows. If (1) and (2) do
express the same proposition, then a person who believes the
proposition expressed by (l),i.e., that Cicero = Cicero,
would also believe the proposition expressed by (2), i.e.,
that Cicero = Tully. In general, this view of proper names
would enta11 that coreferential names al-e interchangeabl'e,
salva veritate, in belief contexts (i.e., the principle of
substitutivity of proper names in belief contexts). However,
this is clearly not the case. Suppose that (3) and (4) are
both true.
(3) Jones believes that Cicero = Cicero.
(4) Jones does not believe that Cicero = Tully.
If ~,ubstitutivity holds then we can substitute IITully" for
9the second occurence of "Cicero" in (3). The result is (5).
(5) Jones believes that Cicero = Tully
But (5) contradicts (4). So, either one of (3) and (4) is
false or the principle of substitutivity is false. It seems
crazy to hold that there couldn't be a situation in which
both (3) and (4) are true. Thus it seems that we must re-
ject the principle of substitutivity.
In his paper, Kripke argues, in effect, that it just
is not clear that there is a situation in which both (3) and
(4) are true. Suppose that (3) is true. Wh~ asks Kripke,
do we think that (4) is true? Well, if we ask Jones "ls
Cicero = Tully?," he says no. He says, we may Sllppose, things
like "I do not believe that Cicero = Tully." Since it seems
natural to assume that Jones ought to know better than anyone
else what he believes, we infer that he does not believe that
Cicero = Tully. If it did follow from the fact that a person
dissents (reflectively, sincerely, etc.) from a particular
sentence that he does not believe the proposition which it
expresses, then (4) would be true (if Jones responds as he
did above). In other words, if what Kripke calls the
.. strerlgthened disquotation principle" is trtle, it seems that one
must grant that (4), along with (3), is true, since Jones
assents to "Cicero = Cicero" and dissents from "Cicero = T'ully."
The main point of the puzzle in "A Puzzle about Beli.ef" is to
show that it is not clear that this principle and other of
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our "normal ways of attributing belief" are t'rue.
But before I turn to Kripke's puzzle, I want to say
a few, I hope, uncontroversial words about puzzles and para-
doxes in general. Not all paradoxes are puzzling to the same
degree. It is a trivial matter to construct a derivation
of a contradiction or of an obvious fals~hood from a set of
premises. Whether such a derivation is paradoxical depends
partly on the plausibility of the premises. If one has good
reason to believe the premises, then the derivation of a
contradiction or of an obvious falsehood will be puzzling.
In general, the more plausible or obvious the premises are,
the more paradoxical the derivation will be.
Consider the following paradoxes. First, here is
a paradox inspired by Russell:
(6) Some barber liB" shaves all and only those
barbers who do not shave themselves.
(7) Either B shaves himself or B does not shave
himself.
(8) If B shaves himself, then B does not shave
himself, since B shaves only those barbers
who do not shave themselves.
(9) If B does not shave himself, then B does
shave himself, since B shaves all those
barbers who do not shave themselves.
(10) B shaves himself if and only if B does not
shave himself.
But (10) is obviously false. It is a contradiction. Of course,
the solution to this puzzle is that there is no such barber "B."
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There simply is no barber who shaves all and only those
barbers who do not shave themselves. The uparadox" is just
a reductio ad absurdum from premise (6). But why is this
reductio considered a paradox at all? Well, it is paradoxical
because it is natural to think, before having seen the argu-
rnent, that there very well COQld be such a barber (just as
it seemed obvious to people before Russell's discovery that
every instance of the axiom schema of comprehension was true) ~
So it is surprising that there can be no such barber. But
that is all that it is, just a bit surprising. We need not
linger over the puzzle any longer.
In contrast, consider the following version of the
liar paradox:
The sentence in therectangle in Jack Cobetto's
doctoral dissertation is not true.
(11) liThe sentence in the rectangle in Jack
Cobetto's doctoral disserta'tion is not
true" is true if and only if the sentence
in the rectangle in Jack Cobetto's doctoral
dissertation is not true.
(12) liThe sentence in the rectangle in Jack Cobetto's
doctoral dissertation is not trtle" = the
sentence in the rectangle in Jack Cobetto's
doctoral dissertation.
(13) The sentence in the rectangle in Jack Cobetto's
doctoral dissertation is true if and only if the
sentence in the rectangle in Jack Cobetto's
doctoral dissertation is not true.
(13), like (10), is, it seems, a contradiction. But (13)
appears to follow from (11) and (12). So, it seems, either
12
(11) or (12), or both, must be false. But both (11) and (12)
seem undeniably to be true.
r will not discuss this puzzle in great detaile
Perhaps the only thing that is obvious about it is that it,s
solution is not obvious. The problem is that even after one
has seen the derivation, both of the premises still seem to
be true and the seemingly contradictory conclusion still ap-
pears to follow. In contrast, in the barber ~aradox, once
one has seen the derivation, one simply recognizes that
premise (6) (perhaps somewhat surprisingly) is false. The
liar paradox can not be "solved" in this way_ It may be that
one of the premises (or both) of the liar paradox is false.
But it is not enough just to say that (II) or (12) is false
in order to solve the puzzle. A real solution will explain
why these premises, if in fact false, seem obviously true. No
such explanation is necessary in order to solve the barber
paradox, for premise (6), though perhaps initially plausible
or unobjectionable to an unsuspecting victim of the paradox,
does not any longer seem obviously true. There is no problem
in simply accepting its falsehood.
What is the situation with Kripke's puzzle? Is it
deeply puzzling like the liar paradox or is it simply a bit
surprising like the barber paradox? I will argue that it i.s
more like the barber paradox than it is like the liar para-
doxe Let us now turn to the puzzle.
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Kripke actually offers two slightly different versions
of the puzzle, one stronger, one weaker. The weaker version,
on which Kripke concentrates most of his efforts, employs the
"disquotation principle, n whereas the stronger version employs
the "strengthened disquotation principle·." I will begin by
considering the stronger version. (I will assume that the
reader is familiar with Pierre and the highly unusual, even
bizarre, manner in which he learned English and French).
(SDPE ) A normal English speaker who is not
reticent will be disposed to sincere reflective 4
assent to lip" if and only if he believes that p.
(T) If a sentence of one language expresses a
truth in that language, then any translation of
it into any other language also expresses a truth
(in that other language) .
(SDP F) [This is obtained by translating II A normal
French speaker who is not reticent will be disposed
to sincere reflective assent to "pll if and only if
he believes that pll in~o French. ]
(14) [ This is obtained by trans lating .. Pierre s in--
cerely assents to IILondres est jolie" into French.
(15) Pierre does not sincerely assent to IILondon
is pretty. II
(16) Pierre is a normal French speaker and also a
normal English speaker.
(17) [by (15), (16), and (SDPE )} Pierre does notbelieve that London is pretty.
(18) [by (14), (16), and (SDPp )] Pierre croit que
Londres est jolie. -
(19) [by (18) and (T)] Pierre believes that London
is pretty.
But (17) and (19) contradict each other.
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Since (17), (18), and (19) follow from the premises
indicated, at least one of those premises must be false. (14)
and (15) seem undeniable. And since Kripke went to such great
lengths to make sure that Pierre can be considered a "normal"
speaker of French and English, let us, at least initially make
this assumption. That l~aves only the two strengthened dis-
quotation principles ((SDP ) and (SOP » and the principle ofE F
translation (T). The two disquotation principles stand or
fall together. It would be incredible to suppose that the
French principle is true while the English version is false,
or vice versa. Let us turn first to the principle of trans-'
la'tion (T).
Is this principle true? Does it even make sense to
doubt it? The answers to these questions are not obvious.
First of all, the translation principle is a universal
statement about all sentences, actual and possible. There
are very many sentences that can be constructed. As a gen-
eral rule in philosophy, when one sees a universal statement
such as (T), one becomes or should become very cautious.
Nevertheless, one might be inclined to think that the trans-
lation principle is as obviously true as the statement that
all bachelors are unmarried. It would not make any sense to
searcll for counterexamples to this statement. It is part of
the meaning of the term "bachelor ll that no one is a bachelor
unless he is unmarried.
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In conversation, several people have given me the
following argument to the effect trlat it does no't make sense
to search for counterexarnpres to the principle of translation.
"Sentences are true or false only indirectly in the sense that
they are used to express true or false propositions. Since
any two sentences which are translations of each other express
the same proposition, and since a proposition has only one truth
value, any sentences which are translations of each other have
the same truth value. II
This argument, though likely to spring to mind to any
advocate of the notion of "propositions," really does not do
the job. Consider the premise that any two sentences which are
translations of each other express the same proposition. Is
it true? Well, it depends on what one mea.ns by "proposition.u
If one introduces the term "proposition" by stipulating that
that is what two sentences which are translations of each other
have in common (expressing the same proposi tion) , t.hen al-
though one premise of the argument would be true by definition,
it would be possible to deny the other premise by Inairltaining
that "propositions" are not the "primary" truth bearers. Tl1at
is, one could maintain that two sentences may express the same
proposition but have different truth values. On the ot11er
hand, if the notion of a IIpropositionll is introduced in another
way such that it is not stipulated that two sentences which
are translations of each other express the same proposition,
16
then it makes sense to look for counterexamples to (T).
So, the above in"formal argument is not conelus i ve, for i t
contains premises which are just as much in doubt as its con-
elusion.
The following two sentences seem to suggest not only that
(T) is not analytically true, but tllat it might actually be false.
(20) Dieser satz ist auf Deutsch.
(21) This sentence is in German.
(21) seems to be the English translation of (20). How else
would one transla te (20)? Certainly the wo:t."'ds "Dieser sa tz II
have the same meaning as the English words "This sentence."
The same is true of the rest of the sentences. However, (20)
seems true, while (21) seems false.
While the principle of transla tion (T), as sta ted,
is dubious, perhaps it can be modified to escape the above
type of counterexarnp~e. Suppose that we modify (T) in n
way which yields (TI ).
(TI ) If a sentence, which co~tains no indexicals,
of one language expresses a truth in that language,
then any translation of it into any other language
also expresses a truth (in that other language) .
For reasons mentioned before, I do not think that this modified
principle is analytically true. It is not obvious that there
are no counterexamples to it. The best that I can do by way
of such an attempt is the following:
Let the biconditional (BE) be true by definition.
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(BE) A person, A, bluttered, at t, that London
is pretty if and only if A uttered, at t,
"London is pretty."
Similarly, 1 would like to introduce a French version of
this defillition.
(BF) [This is obtained by translating (B ) intoFrench (introducing another word for IIbtutter ll ),
and substi tuting II Londres est j olie" wrlerever
"London is pretty" occurs in {BE).l
Now suppose
(22) At t, A utt2red IILondres est jolie ll (and nothing
else) .
By (22) and (BF), we have
(23) A bluttered at t [in French] que Londres est
jolie. By (23) and (Tl ) we have
(24) A bluttered at t that London is pretty.
But by (22) and (BE) we have
(25) A did not blutter at t that London is pretty.
(24) and (25) contradict each other.
There is even less room to maneuver here than in Kripke's
puzzle.
true by definition. Also, there would not seem to be any
problem in supposing that (22) is true. Thus we are left
with the inference from (23) to (24). There are two steps
involved in this inference. First, (24) is taken to be a trans-
lation of (23). Also (24) is taken to be true. Since the truth
of (24) follows from (Tl ) (if (24) is a tranlsation of (23) and
neither contains any indexicals), we must say either that (24)
is not a translation of (23) or that (Tl ) is false.
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I am strongly inclined to say that (24) just is not a
translation of (23). However, this does not seem to me to be
obvious. If the expression IILondres est jolie" appeared in
quotation marks in (23), then it would be obvious that they are
translations of each other. After all, IIA uttered at t
"London is prettylill is clearly not a translation of itA
a prononc~ "Londres est jolie." When translating "A uttered
"London is pretty"" into another language, one does not
translate the expressions inside the quotation marks. 5 But
the expressions in question in (23) and (24) do not appear in
quotation marks. They appear in "that" clauses. And, we do
typically translate expressions when they appear in such contexts.
So neither (T) or the modified principle (T I ) is obviously
true. We have reason to doubt them without ever being aware
of (T) 's use in Kripke's puzzle.- Thus the situation here is
different from the situations in which we find ourselves when
we consider different versions of the liar paradox. In those
cases, all the premises seem indubitable even after one has
seen the derivation of an apparentconttadi6ti6n. Although
Kripke compares his puzzle to the liar paradox, it just does
not have ttle same stature in that not all its premi ses have
the same degree of indubitability.
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However, in spite of thi~ I do not think that the solution
to Kripke's puzzle lies in the rejection of (T), or (TI ), or
other modifications of these principles. There is a totally
obvious premise that will, when combined with the other premises
of the puzzle, serve just as well as principle (T) in allowing
Kripke to deduce a contradiction. The premise is (TIl).
(TIl) If "Pierre croit que Londres est jolie" is true
then so is "Pierre believes that London is pretty"
(where "Pierre" is taken to refer to the same person
in both sentences and "London" and "Londres" are
taken to refer to the same city) .
By (TIl), we can still infer (19) from (18) and get the contra-
diction. Since (TIl) is not a generalization,we need not
worry about there being any counterexamples to it. So, none
of the lIa priori" doubts that accompany most universal state-
ments need worry us. Furthermore, (TIl) is no less plausible
than (T). Indeed l part of the reason for believing that
general principles (T) and(T1 ) are true is that the "instances"
of those principles, such as (TIl), seem to be true.
Consider the liar paradox again. (11), the first premise
of the version given in this paper, is an instance of what has
come to be known as the Tarski schema. To most, the Tarski
schema has seemed obviously true. But (11) does not gain its
plausibility because it is an instance of that schema. Rather
the schema seems true because all or most of ,the instances of
it which naturally come to mind seem to be trueD The version
of the liar paradox given above is no less strong because it
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uses an instance of the Tarski schema rather than the schema
itself. Similarly, the new version of the strong belief puzzle
is no less strong because it employes (TIl) instead of (T) or
(TI ) .
Given that the puzzle can be fortified in this way, let
us turn our attention to the disquotation principles. Since,
as I said before, (SDPE) and (SDPp ) stand or fall together, I
will discuss only (SDPE). This principle seems to be at least
initially plausible. For instance, if we ask a person whether
he believes that grass i.s green and he responds, "Yes, grass
is green," we do infer (in normal circumstances) that he believes
that grass is green. Similarly, if we had asked that person
if he believed that grass is purple and he had responded, tlNo,
grass is not purple," we would have inferred that he does not
believe that grass is purple. But just as philosophers have
become very good at coming up with -counterexamples to initially
plausible universal statements, they have become equally pro-
ficient at refuting "if and~ only if" statements. It seems to
me that this is exactly what Kripke has done in dreaming up
Pierre. He has found a counterexample to an initially plausible
"if and only if" statement. It may be surprising that the prin-
ciple turns out to be false, but it should not be viewed as
a deeply troubling result.
Compare the strengthened disquoation principle (SDPE)
to another very famous "if and only if" statement in recent
21
philosphyo
(K) A person knows that p if and only if 'he has
a justified true belief that p.
Principle (K) is often referred to as lithe traditional analysis
of knowing that p.n This principle is not only initially plaus-
ible, it was for a long time accepted as a correct analysis of
knowledge. However, Gettier succeeded in constructing CQunter-
examples to it.
I do not want to discuss Gettier's actual example, but
rather how philosophers have reacted to it. When it was
presented, the counterexample was not taken'to reveal anything
deeply puzzling about "knowing that p." It was taken as yet
another illustration of how difficult it is to formulate a
correct "analysis" of major philosophical concepts. Philoso-
phers reacted by saying, "Gee, that's surpri.sing. I wish
I had thought of it. Oh well, itis back to the drawing
board. .. I think this is the reaction that philosophers shOtlld
have to Kripke's Pierre. The puzzle just shows, among other
things, tha t the strengthened di sqt10ta tion pr inciples (SDPE)
and (SDPF) are too strong. They must be modified.
A brief look at several possible modifications of
these principles will help us see where they go wrong. Con-
sider the following modification of (SDPE).
(SDP~l) A believes that p if and only if A sincerely
and reflectively (etc.) assents to "p."
22
This principle differs from (SDPE ) in that it does not have any
constraints as to whom or to what "All may refer. In Kripke's
puzzle, (SDPE) has the co~dition that the believer (or non-
believer) be a normal English speaker.
this condition, does not seem at all plausible. For instance,
suppose that A is some dog and lip" is replaced by "the yellow
bowl is empty.1I Also, suppose that the dog is usually fed
by putting dog food into the yellow bowl and calling the dog.
Whenever the dog is called at around 5:00, he goes to the bowl.
If the bowl is empty, he puts his paw into the bowl and moves
the bowl around. Suppose that, knowing this, we call the dog
at 5:00 and do not put any food into the bowl. As expected, the
dog puts his paw into it and moves it around. It is awfully
tempting to say that the dog~believes that the yellow bowl
is empty. After all, that is why he put his paw into it.
However, according to (SDPE
I ) this is false. The dog does not
believe that the yellow bowl is empty because h;~ is not disposed
to (sincerely and reflectively) assent to "the yellow bowl is
empty .. " So, if we want to attribute any beliefs to animals
or people who do not speak a language, we must modify (SDPE
1 ).
These considerations suggest that (SDPE
1 ) be modified
as follows:
(SDP II) A person, A, who speaks a language, believes
thatEp if and only if he sincerely (etc.) assents to "n."
This principle leaves open the possibility that animals and
23
people who do not speak a language have beliefs even though
they do not assent to or dissent from sentences. But this
principle is also clearly inadequate. S~ppose that we sub-
stitute "snow is white" for lip" and take "All to refer to
some person who speaks only German. This person is not dis-
posed to assent to If snow is whi te. ~. However, he may sti11
believe that snow is white. His belief may be manifested
by his willingness to make assertions like "Ieh glaube dass
der schnee weiss ist." Obviously, people who speak only
languages other ~han English can believe that snow is white~
What we want to allow is that someone may believe
that snow is white and that this belief may be manifested not
only by sincere assent to "snow is white" but also by sincere
assent to a sentence in some other language that would typically
be taken to indicate that the person believes that snow is
white. The following principle is an attempt to capture this:
III(SDP ) A person, A, who speaks some language,be1i~ves that p if and only if he sincerely (etc.)
assents to lip" or to some other sentence which is
a translation of lip" or expresses the same propo-
sition as lip."
This principle is not identical to (SDPE) G One cannot derive
the contradiction which Kripke does if one substitutes (SDPE
lll )
IIIfor (SDPE), because (SDPE ), (15), and (16) do not entail
(17). Pierre does believe that London is pretty because he
assents to "Londres est jolie" which is just a translation of
"London is pretty." His failure to assent to "London is
pretty" does not allow us to infer by (SDPE111) that he does
not believe that London is pretty.
24
Given all of this, it is easy to see why Kripke's
principle (SDPE ) does allow us to derive a contradiction.
It goes wrong ~n that it does not allow for the possibility
that a person's belief that snow is white (or any other
belief) may be inferred from his assent to some sentence
in another language which is a translation of II snow is white. II
I do not mean to imply that Kripke's principle (SDPE) has no
plausibility at all. Indeed, when a person actually dissents
from a particular sentence such as II snow is \alhi te," it is
a pretty safe bet that he does not believe that snow is
white. The point is that it is not a sure bet. Discovering
that it is not a sure bet is the real importance of Kripke's
puzzle. The moral of the puzzle should not be taken to be
that it, like the liar paradox v reveals some seemingly un-
solvable problem with the notion of belief or with our ways
of attributing belief. Rather, the puzzle simply presents
a counterexample to the perhaps long accepted idea that one
can infer from the fact that a person dissents from a
sentence such as "London is pretty" that he does not believe
that London is pretty. Just as with the traditional analysis
of knowledge, we must now go about modifying (SDP E ) if we want
to arrive at a correct analysis of belief. Unlike the premises
of the liar paradox, after we have seen the problem, we
should not feel t~t (SDPE ) is still, in spite of this, self
evident or indubitable.
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But nlodifying the strengthened disquotation principles
in an appropriate manner, if Kripke is correct, does
not put an end to our difficulties. Indeed, in his article,
Kripke does not spend very much time discussing the strong
version of the puzzle. Rather, Kripke's official version
of the puzzle employs much weaker premises than (SDPE ) and
(SDPp ). I will call these weaker disquotation principles
.. (DP )" and .. (DPp ) • IIE
(DPE) If a normal English speaker, on reflection,sincerely assents to "p,1I then he believes that p.
(OP) [This is the same as (DP ) except that
it is stated" in French and " a n§rmal English
speaker" is replaced with the French translation
of "a normal French speaker."]
Here is the "official" puzzle about belief:
(26) [This is obtained by translating "pierre
assents to "Londres est jolie ll II into French.]
(27) Pie'rre assents to "London is not pretty. II
(28) Pierre is a normal speaker of both English
and French.
By (26) and (OPF), we have
(29) Pierre croit que Londres est jolie.
By (29) and (T), we have
(30) Pierre believes that London is pretty.
But by (27) and (DPE), we have
(3]) Pierre believes that London is not pretty.
There is no contradi~tion yeti however, at this
point, Kripke introduces another premise. He says,
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We may suppose that Pierre, in spite of the
unfortunate situation in which he now finds him-
self, is a leading philosopher and logician. He
would never let contradictory beliefs pass. And
surely anyone, leading logician or no, is in prin-
ciple in a position to notice and correct contra-
dictory beliefs i~ he has theme Precisely for
this reason, we regard individuals who contradict
themselves as subject to greater censure than
those who merely have false beliefs. But, it is
clear that Pierre, as long as he is unaware that
the cities he calls "London ll and IlLondres" are
one and the same, is in no position to see, by
logic alone, that at least one of his beliefs
must be false. He lacks information, not logical
acumen. He cannot be convicted of inconsistency:
to de so is incorrect. 6
So Kripke takes the following principle to be a premise
of the puzzle:
(e) If a person has contradictory beliefs,
then he is, in principle, in a position to
tell through the use of logic alone that he
has contradictory beliefs.
The truth of (30) and (31) entails that Pierre has contra-
dietary beliefs. But (e) and the fact that Pierre cannot
tell through the use of logic alone that he has contradictory
beliefs entail that he does not have contradictory beliefs.
What are we to reject here? (26), (27), and (28)
seem, as before,obviously true. And even if (T) is not
totally obvious, we could still infer (30) from (29) by
using the more specific and indubitable (TIl) as a premise.
The disquotation principles CDPE) and (DPF ) stand or fall
together and seem true. Nothing that I have said so far
has cast any doubt on these weaker principles. Indeed, we
could still derive a contradiction using the modified
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This leaves (C) as an obvious candidate for rejection.
I am surprised that Kripke uses it as a premise. It is under-
standable why someone would think that the disquotation prin-
ciples in their stronger and weaker forms are true. We do,
in fact, often attribute belief or disbelief on the basis of
the sentences to which, and from which,a person is disposed
to assent or dissent. But premise (C) is not so cornmon. The
situation here seems to be the same as it was with respect
to (SDPE ) and (SDPF ). Premise (C) may be at least initially
plausible, but Kripke has simply come up with a counterexample
to it. Pierre just happens to be a person who has contra-
dietary beliefs even though he cannot tell that he does through
the use of logic alone.
Perhaps Kripke has some reason other than its initial
plausibility for thinking that (C) is true. He does not defend
(C) any more fully in places other than the quotation given
above. I want now to consider some independent reasons for
doubting (C). First, Kripke states (C) in different ways in
several places in his paper. Sometimes he uses the ex-
pression .. inconsistent" instead of the expression "contt."adictor"y. II
But this difference i"s poten.tially very important. If II incon-
sistent" is defined in the same way as it is defined in many
elementary logic books, two propositions are inconsistent
if and only if it is impossible for them both to be true. If
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this means that they are inconsistent if and only if there is
no possible world (in Kripke's sense) in which they are both
true, then (e) would seem clearly false~
Consider (32), (33), and (34):
(32) Cicero was bald.
(33) Tully was not bald.
(34) Tully was bald.
If Kripke is correct, there is no possible world in which (32)
and (33) are both true (since "Cicero" and "Tully" are rigid
designations of the same person). However, many if not most
philosophers would not deny that a person, Jones, can believe
both that Cicero was bald and that Tully was not bald. But
it takes m~ch more than logical acumen to determine that (32)
and (33) are inconsistent. One must know that "Cicero" and
"Tully" are coreferential. Thus, if these philosophers are
correct, (e) is clearly false when the term "inconsistent"
is used instead of "contradictory" and understood in the
manner above.
Even if the term contradictory is used in (C), there are
other reasons for doubting (e). I will attempt to bring these
o~t by comparing (e) to several closely related principles.
Consider (Cl ):
(Cl ) If a person understands two sentences which
express contradictory propositions, then that
person is in principle in a position to determine
through the use of logic alone that they express
contradictory propositions.
1Surely (C ) is just as plausible as (C). A logician who
understands two sentences should be able to determine through
the use of logic alone whether they express contradictory
propositions. But consider the following possibility. Suppose
that Paul grows up in France, and learns to speak French just
like everyone else. In particular, he often hears about so~e
city called "Londres," and for this reason, he understands the
sentance "Londres est jolie" perfectly well. Unfortunately,
Paul suffers a blow to the head and, while unconscious, is
shipped off to America. In the U.S., Puul has to learn English
from scratch. That is, he can not find any people who speak
both French and English who can help him learn English. Also,
he lives in a depressed area, and there are no dictionaries
or any other kind of cevice that could be of any help. In
spite ~f this, he manages to learn English. Furthermore, he
occasionally hears about a ci ty oversees called II Londorl . Ii
Thus he understands the sentence IILondon is not pretty."
However, being dense like Pierre, Paul does not realize that
IlLondres" and "London" are 11ames of the same city.
Clearly the 'two sentel1ces "Londres est jolie ll and
II London is not pretty:I expres s contradictory propos i tions
(when ~~London" and "Londres" are taken to refer to the same
thing). But even if we suppose that Paul like Pierre, is a
leading logician of the time, Paul is just not in a position
to tell, through the USE of logic alone, that the two sentences
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express contradictory propositions. Moreover, I have developed
Paul's situation so that the only important difference between
his story and Pierre's story is that Kripke has told a slightly
longer story about Pierre to insure that Pierre will give his
sincere reflective assent to both "Londres est jolie U and
"London is 110t pretty." I made no such provisions in telling
Paul's story. Only Paul's understanding with respect to the
propositions in question, not whether he believes them, is at
issue.
This example suggests that Pierre's belief puzzle is not,
in a sense, a puzzle about belief at all. Paul is a counter-
example to the principle (Cl ). He understands two sentences
that express contradictory propositions, yet he is not able to
tell through the use of logic alone that they do express contra-
dictory propositions. And, given that (C l ) is false, i.s there
any reason to think that (C) is true and that we can not modify
Paul' 5 story slightly in order to get him to believe t11e two
propositions which he understands but fails to realize are
contradictory? What is it about belief in contrast to mere
understanding that insures that (C) is true even though (C l )
is false? Unless one can offer some reason for there being a
difference, one is not justified in maintaining (C) (and re-
jecting (Cl » in the face of examples like Paul and Pierre.
Let me make this point in a somewhat dlLferent way_ Here
is a variation on Kripke's puzzle {Peter g we shall assume
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is in the same sort of difficulty as Paul and Pierre with
respect to "London" and "Londres").
(~) If a person (in appropriate circumstances)
ut~ered "London is not pretty" at t, then he, at
t, asse~ted (or said) that London is not pretty.
(AF) [This is obtained by translating "If a person(in appropriate circumstances) uttered "Londres est
jolie" at t, then he, at t, asserted (or said) that
London is pretty" into French.]
(T)
(35 )
Peter
[This is the same as before.]
[This is obtained by translating "At t,
uttered IILondres est jolie" ll into French.]
(36) At t, Peter also uttered "London is not pretty. II 7
(37) Peter asserted, at t, that London is not pretty.
By (35 ) and (Ap ) , we have~
(38) [This is obtained by translating "Peter asserted,
at t, that London is pretty" into Frencha]
By (38) and (Tl, we have:
(39) Peter,at t, asserted (or said) that London
is pretty.
Add to this the following principle:
(ell) If a person at some time, t, has contradicted
himself, then he is, in principle, in a position
to tell through the use of logic alone that he has.
But from (39) and (37), we have:
(40) Peter, at t, asserted both that London is
pretty, and that London is not pretty.
(40) clearly entails that:
(41) Peter, at t, contradicted himself.
However, since we have assumed that Peter is just like Pierre,
it is clear that:
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(42) Peter is not in a position to tell through
the use of logic alone that he has contradicted
himself.
But by (42) and (ell), we have:
(43) Peter, at t, did not contradict himself.
However, (43) contradicts (41).
~fuat are we to reject? Surely (~) and (AF) are true,
since uttering sentences in "appropriate" circumstances is
clearly one of the ways in which we make assertions. Even if
(T) is somewhat doubtful, we could replace it with (TIll)
which is clearly true.
(TIll) If the French translation of "Peter, at t,
asserted that London is pretty" is true, then so
is "Peter, at t, asserted that London is pretty" (-
(where "Peter" and "London" are understood to refer
to the same person and city) .
Moreover, (ell) is just as plausible as (e) or (e l ). Thus
we might call this variation of Kripke's puzzle "a puzzle
about assertion."
Of course, my solution to this paradox will not surprise
the reader. I think we must simply reject (ell). It may have
been plausible initially; but it turns out to have counter-
examples 0 People like Peter ;ust can, in some rather unusual
circumstances, contradict themselves without being able to tell
through the use of lugic alone that they have done so. Once we
recognize this potential problem, the paradox disappears.
Given that both (e l ) and (ell) are false and qiven obvious
similarities between the counterexamples. which I have offered
to them, what reason is there to think that Pierre is not just
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a counterexample to ee)? In light of my examples of Peter
and Paul, I think it is possible to see what is,at root,
really surprising about all three situations. The probleln is
that Peter, Paul, and Pierre are all under the mistaken impression
that the two sentences "Londres est jolie" and "London is pretty"
are used to express different propositions. They do not
realize that one is just a translation of the other. It is
a bit surprising that this kind of situation could arise.
However, once we have gotten over our initial surprise,we should
not be shocked that principles like (Cll), (C l ) and (C), which
ignore the possibility of such unusual people as Peter, Paul
and Pierre, all turn out to be false. The solution to the
puzzle about belief, just as the solutions to the puzzles about
understanding and assertion, lies in the simple recogni tion t.hat
some principles which formerly seemed plausible must, in the
light of the counterexamples above, be modified or rejected.
II
I have answered Kripke's prominent question "Does
Pierre believe that London is pretty?" and given a solu-
tion to his puzzle. This is all that he actually asks
for in his article. But l\ripke also says that the mere
discovery of the puzzle forces us to reconsider several
widely held views in the philosophy of language. Primary
among these is the view discussed at the beginning of
this paper, that belief contexts are not "Shakespearean,"
i.e, that codesignative proper names cannot be substi-
tuted for each other, salva veritate, in belief contexts.
In the remainder of this paper, I will evaluate and
argue against some of the general claims that Kripke
makes about the puzzle. Also, I will discuss several
solutions which have recently been offered to the puzzle
and argue that these solutions support my claims about
the general significance of Kripke's puzzle.
Let me begin with the main conclusion which Kripke
draws and the one with which I am, to some extent, in
agreement. Given our present state of knowledge, the
simple conclusion that coreferential proper names are
not interchangeable, salva veri tate, in belief contexts
is not justified. Kripke correctly maintains that his
puzzle undermines -the most common argument for that
seemingly obvious conclusion. Consider sentences (44)
and (45).
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(44) Jones believes that Cicero was bald.
(45) Jones believes that Tully was bald.
It has seemed to most philosophers that (44) can be
true while (45) is false. Suppose that Jones does not
know that "Cicero" and "Tully" are doreferential. It
is easy to see (especially after one has gotten used to
these types of examples) that Jones might assent to
"Cicero was bald," but dissent from "Tully was bald."
If one asks Jones what he believes, he will respond that
he believes that Cicero was bald but not that Tully was
bald. But who should know better about Jones' beliefs
than Jones himself? As Kripke points out, we infer by
the strong disquotation principle (SDPE) that (44) is
true while (45) is falsea Since (45) can be obtained
from (44) simply by substituting the name "Tully" for
the coreferential name IICicero," it follows that co-
referential proper names are not always interchangeable,
salve veritate, in belief contexts. Kripke's puzzle
undermines this argument by casting doubt on the strong
disquotation principle (and other similar principles) .
Indeed, I've argued that puzzling Pierre simply shows
that this principle is falseo Either way, the above
argument is seen to rely on a premise, (SDPE), that is,
at best, doubtful. Thus we are not justified in
accepting the argument's conclusion.
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However, while I agree ·chat the argument is not
conclusive, it is not clear to what extent it has been
weakened by the discovery of the puzzle. The strength
of the argument depends on the strength of our inference
that Jones does not believe that Tully was bald from the
fact that he does not assent to "Tully was bald." While
the strong disquotation principle is false or at least
doubtful, might there not be some other principle just
as plausible as (SDPE) which not only enables us to make
the desired inference but is true as well? Suppose that
we modify (SDPE) as follows (again, for the sake of
sirnplici ty I will give in6stances o.f the intended prin-
ciples):
(MOP) A normal English speaker, wh2 speaks no
other language, believes that Tully was bald
if and only if he gives his sincere (reflective,
etc.) assent to "Tully was bald."
Obviously, the idea behind the modification is precisely
to exclude Pierre and other ldlingual counterexamnles
to the original strong disquotation principle. Since
Jones, we may suppose, speaks only English, it is valid
to infer from (MOP) that Jones does not believe that Tully
was bald, and that (44) "is true while (45) is false.
The important questioIl is whether any of the con-
siderations Kripke has raised with his puzzle cast any
doubt on (MOP) and other instances of the intended
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principle behind it. Here is what Kripke has to say
about this:
,Jones' situation strikingly resembles
Pierre's. . . Intuitively, Jones' assent
to both "Cicero was bald" and "Tully was
not bald" [' and his dissent from "Tully was
bald" ] arises from sources of just the same
kind as Pierre's assent to both "Londres
est jolie" and "London is not prettY"a{ and
his dissent from "London is pretty l. II
But is Jones' case really "just the same ll as Pierre's?
Certainly there are striking similarities. There are also
striking differences. It does seem true that both Jones
and Pierre behave (with respect to the sentences to which
and from which they will assent and dissent) in the unusual
ways in which they do because they are unaware that two
proper names are coreferential. If Pierre knew that
"Londres" and "London" both denote the same city, he
would not assent to both IILondres est jolie" and "Lo11don
is not pretty," and dissent from IILondon is pretty."
Similarly, if Jones knew that "Cicero" and "Tully" are
coreferential, he would not assent to both "Cicero was
bald" and nTully was not bald," and dissent from "Tully
was bald. 1I However, the cases are different in that the
names about .which Jones is mistaken are both names in
the English language, whereas the names about which
Pierre is mistaken are not both names in the English
language. I do not know and will not discuss whether
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this difference is important or perhaps even crucial. My
point is only that Kripke is giving an argument from
analogy. The strength of this argument against the
claim that one can not substitute coreferentiai proper
names, salva veritate, in belief contexts can not be
assessed until the strength of this analogy is determined.
Let us now turn to some other conclusions which
Kripke feels are warranted in light of puzzling Pierre.
Consider the following passage from his article
When we enter into the area exemplified by
Jones and Pierre, we enter into an area
where our normal practices of j!terpretation
and attribution of belief are subjected to
the greatest possible strain, perhaps to the
point of breakdown. So is the notion of the
content of someone's assertion, the propo-
sition it expresses. 9
This brings the notions of a IIproposi tion" and IIproposi-
tional conten't ll into the discussion for tIle first time.
Kripke seems to be saying that his puzzle causes a
problem for these notions. Indeed, this impression is
reinforced when we look at a similar quotation at the end
of the preface to the book Naming and Necessity. He says,
How this relates to the question of what
IIpropositions" are expressed by these sentences,
whether these "propositions" are objects of
knowledge and belief, and in general, how to
treat names in epistemic contexts, are vexing
questions. I have no "official doctrine" con-
cerning them, and in fact I am unsure that the
apparatus of "propositions" does not break
down in this area. 10
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I want now to argue, at some length, that this suggestion
is misguided. There is a clear and natural way of under-
standing the term "proposition" which is in no way
threatened by any of the doubts which are, in fact,
justified by Kripke's discovery of the puzzle.
Here is one natural way of understanding the
term "proposition." Suppose that the following exchange
takes place between three people, A, B, and C, during a
serious discussion of the state of the government:
A: "The president is wise."
B: "That's true. I, too, believe that the
president is wise."
c: "Yes, the president is wise. II
Given only these sincere utterances for information,
it seems clear that we can make the following inferences.
(46) A asserted that the president is wise.
(47) C asserted that the president is wise.
(48) B believes that the president is wise.
It seems obvious that (46)-(48) entail, respectively, (49),
(50), and (51).
(49) A asserted something.
(50) C asserted something.
(51) B believes something.
It also seems clear that (52) and (53) are in some sense,
true.
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(52) A and C asserted the same thing.
(53) B believes the same thing that both A
and C asserted.
But given that (46)-(53) are all true, are not (54)-(58)
true as well?
(54) There is something which A asserted
(i. e., that the president is wise) .
(55) There is something which C asserted.
(56) There is something which B believes.
(57) There is something which both A and
C asserted.
(58) ~here is something which B believes
and which both A and C asserted.
Are not these sentences used to assert the same things
that (49)-(53) are used to assert? (54)-(58) do sound a
bit awkward, but there may be circumstance in which it
would be just as natural to utter them as it would be
to utter (49)~(53). And even if there are no such
circumstances they may still be true. Let us assume
they are.
(54)-(58) granunatically resemble the followi.ng
sentences:
(59) There is someone whom A loves.
(60) There is someone whom Cloves.
(61) There is someone whom B hates.
(62) There is someone whom both A and Clove.
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(63) There is someone whom B hates and whom
both ~ and Clove.
· Furthermore, certainly no one would object to representing
(in semi~logical notation) (59)-(63) in the following way:
(64) (3x)(A loves x).
(65) ( :3x) (C loves x).
(66) ( 3x) (B hates x) CI
(67) ( 3 x) (A and C love x) .
(68) ( 3x) (B hates x and both A and C love x') .
But if (59)-(63) are correctly represented by (64)-(68),
are not (54)-(58) correctly represented by (69)-(73)?
(69) (3x)(A asserted x).
(70) ( 3xj (C asserted x) •
(71) (3x)(B believes x).
(72) ( 3x) (A and C asserted x) •
(73) ( 3x) (B believes x and both A and C
asserted x) •
For the moment, let us assume that they are.
It seems obvious that other ''proposi-tional atti tude"
sentences similar to (46)-(53) will entail sentences
analogous to (69)-(73) (if (46)-(53) entail (54)-(58)).
So, on ~the assumptions we have been making, there is a
class of objects which satisfy open sentences like '~A
asserted x," liB believes x," "A asserted x a11(1 B
believes x and C knows X,iI and others derived in an
obvious way from what have come to be known as "proposi-
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tional attitude" sentences. Let us call these objects
"propositions. II Roughly, an object is a proposition if
and only if it satisfies or could satisfy an open sentence
obtained in the above obvious manner from a "propositional
attitude" sentence. This definition is sloppy, but I
trust that any philosopher who is at all acquainted with
the many discussions involving the term "propositionll wi.ll
understand what is intended.
Before continuing, let me address two objections
that might be raised at this point. First, while intro-
ducing the te"':11l "proposition" in this way makes our
reasons for thinking that there are such things relatively
clear, (they are the same reasons we have for thinking
that sentences like (69)-(73) are true, i.e., they seem
inferable from propositional attitude sentences like
(46)-(53).), these reasons may not be good reasons.
Indeed, the inferences from (54)-(58) to (69)-(73) are
especially suspect. Philosophers of language are fond
of pointing out how IImere" grammatical similarities
between sentences can mislead if one is not careful.
Accordingly, we must be very cautious in inferring any-
thing from the fact that (54)-(58) are grammatically
similar to (59)-(63). I will not discuss this issue in
detail. In this paper, I will be cOllcerned only with
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what properties propositions have~ assuming that they
exist, and whether this notion of a "proposition" is,
as Kripke claims, strained to the point of breaking down
in the cases of Pierre and Jones.
The ser=ond objection which I want to consider i.s a
bit more difficult to respond to. It would be a simple
task to introduce a notion of a "proposition" unrelated
to the one which Kripke intends and then show that his
claim that the notion 6£ a proposition, in ~ sense, is
"strained to the breaking point" \vhen Y.vF!. enter the realm
of cases like Pierre and Jones, is incorrect. It
remains for me to establish that Kripke and I have the
same notion of "proposition" in mind. Unfortunately,
this is not possible. As I mentioned earlier, Kripke
does not indicate precisely what he means by the term
"proposition." In lieu of such an explanation, my argu·-
ment will be that my notion of a "proposition" captures
al'l important use of the term "proposi tion II in the recent
history of the philosophy of language and is not threatened
or strained in cases like Pierre's and Jones'. To this
end, let us first exarnille some of the claims that are
often made about propositions.
Beginning philosophy students are typically intro-
duced to the te1ill "proposition" through the ~se of pairs
London is pretty.
Londres est jolie.
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of :.sentences such as (74a) and (74b), and (7Sa) and
( 7Sb) •
(74a)
(74b)
(75a)
(75b)
John is a bachelor.
John is an unmarried male adult.
Philosophers, like most people, have noticed that the two
sentences in each of these pairs seem to have something
very important in common. These are paradigm examples
of two sentences "expressing the same proposi tion. I~ A
person uttering both sentences in one of the above pairs
is often said to have "expressed the same proposition. II
Students quickly catch on to this usage of the term "propo-
sitiorr' and are usually able to point out other pai~s of
sentences which seem related to each other in an analogous
way.
In recent years, however, philosophers have come
more and more to the realization that the relationship
between the sentences in each of the above pairs is a
bit more complex. Most importantly, these sentences are
now widely viewed as having several things in common.
On the one hand, both of the sentences in each of t~e
pairs can be used to assert the same thing, i.e., that
London is pretty or that John is a bachelor. But Loth
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of the sentences in the above pairs may also be said to
have the same meaning. This distinction, between what
is asserted by a person using a particular sentence and
the meaning of that sentence is central to several of the
most important recent articles which investigate the
notion of a "proposition. 1I
In his famous article "On referring," Strawson
says:
Generally, as against Russell, I shall say
this. Meaning (in at least one important
sense) is a function of the sentence or
expreasion; mentioning and referring and truth
and falsity, are functions of the use of the
the sentence or expression. To give the
meaning of an expression (in this sense in
which I am using the word) is to give general
directions for its use to refer to or
mention p~rticlila~objects or person5; to give
the meaning of a sentence is to give ~eneral
directions for its use in making true and
false assertions. It is not to talk about
any particular occasion of the use of the
sentence or expression. The meaning of an
expression cannot be identified with the
object it is used, on ~ particular occasion,
to refer to. The meaning of a sentence cannot
be identified with the assertion it is used,
on a particular occasion, to make. For to
talk about the meaning of an expression or
sentence is not to talk about its use on a
particular occasion, but about the rules,
habits, conventions governing its correct
use, on all occasions, to refer or to assert. 11
While Strawson's discussion is general and intuitive,
others have discussed this distinction (and others) in
greater detail. In his article "Propositions," Richard
Cartwright carefully distinguishes what is asserted on a
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particular occasion by uttering a sentence from several
other things with which it has been confused. Here is
how Cartwright argues for the claim that what is asserted
in uttering a sentence is not always identical with the
meaning of that sentence.
Consider, for this purpose, the words lilt's
raining. II These are words, in the uttering
of which, people often (though not always)
assert something. But of course what is
asserted varies from one occasion~their
utterance to another. A person who utters
them one day does not (normally) make the same
statement as one who utters them the next; and
one who utters them in Oberlin does not
usually assert what is asserted by one who
utters them in Detroit. But these variations
in what is asserted are not accompanied by
corresponding changes in meaning. The words
"~tls raini~gll retain the same meaning
tnroughout.!2 .
Also, Cartwright produces examples to show that sameness of
meaning of sentence uttered is not even in all cases a
necessary condition for sameness of assertion made. The
following example, though it is not Cartwright's, will
suffice to establish this. Suppose that I assert that
I am hot by uttering the sentence "I am hot. 1I Another
person could assert the very same thing, i.e., that I am
hot, by pointing at me and uttering the sentence "You are
hot. II Yet, the two sentences "I am hot ll and "You are hot"
do not l1ave the same meaning. The words III" and "you Ri
have different meanings and consequently the sentences of
~hich they are constituents differ in meaning as well.
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Cartwright even presents an argument to establish
that the meaning of a sentence is never identical to
what the sentence has been used to assert. He says,
If what someone asserts, on some occasion,
is itself the meaning which the words he
utters have, on that occasion of their
utterance, then anything predicable of what
he asserts must also be predicable of the
meaning of his words. But it is obvious on
very little reflection that ever so many
'things predicable of what is asserted cannot
(on pain of nonsense) be predicated of the
meaning of a sentence. And the fundamental
point to be noticed in this connection is
that although we maypredicete of something
asserted that it is (or was) asserted~ this
cannot be predicated of the meaning of a
sentence. It simply makes no sense to say
that someone asserted the meaning of a
sentence -- any more than it makes sense to
say he said it.13
In light of these arguments, I will, from now on, aSSl~e
that Strawson and Cartwright are correct about the need
to distinguish, in sentences like (74) through (77),
the meanings of the sentences from what they can be used
to assert.
Cartwright and Strawson are not the only ones who
have noticed this distinctionD ~hile they use similar
terminology, other philosophers who have discussed the
11
distinction use somewhat different language. For example,
in an article entitled "Sentences, Statements, and
Propositions," E.J. Lemmon uses the term "proposition"
rather differently. 14 While both Strawson and Cartwright
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u.se the word uproposition" to apply to what is asserted, ,~)
Lemmon uses it, I will argue, in connection with the
meani~ of a sentence. He says that when we utter (in
"appropriate" circumstances) a sentence we both "express
a proposition" and "make a statement." For IJenunon, lithe
statement made ll denotes tr..e same thing that Cartwright
and Strawson denote with the term "proposition." Un-
fortunately Lenunon's use of the term "proposition" is a
bit problematic. He says that a proposition not only can
have a truth value; but unlike a statement, it can
even change in truth value over time.
To see what Lemmon has in mind, consider again the
sentence .. It's raining." Lemmon holds that a person wtlO
utters (in lIappropriate" circumstances) this sentence
today has expressed a proposition which is, we may suppose,
true. But a person could utter the sentence tomorrow
and, according to Lemmon, express the same proposition.
Yet, that proposition will be false tomorrow even though
it is true today. What has remai.ned constant in the two
contexts of utterance that would justify us in saying
that the same proposition has been expressed? Clearly
different statements, in Cartwright's and Strawson's
sense, have been made. Thus Lemmon is not using the
term "proposition" to denote what has been asserted by
uttering the sentence.
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It would seem that we have two choices. The propo-
sition is either the sentence "It's raining" itself or
the meaning of trLe sentence (which has not changed) ·
Lemmon gives examples that n\ake it clear that he does not-
intend the phrase "proposition expressed" to denote the
sentence which has been uttered. He says,
If I say, "I am hot," and you, being French,
say IIJ'ai chaud," then we have neither
uttered the same sentence nor made the same
statement; but there is still a sense in
which we have said the same thing, namely,
expressed the same proposition. IS
And since ItJ'ai chaud" and"I am hot" (if uttered by
different people) 9an not be used to make the same state-
ment or assertion, it seems that Lemmon is using the term
"proposition expressed" to refer to the mean.ing of the two
sentences,which has indeed remained constant throughout
both contexts of vtterance. 16
Although one might object that too much ti~e has
been spent discussing mere differences of terminology.
But I think the discussion confirms the claims that I have
made regarding my use' ofo the term IIproposi tion. " Clearly
what I call a "proposi tion" has been noticed and discussed
by many other philosophers. Cartwright refers to it more
frequently as "what is asserted," w11ile Lemmon calls it
a "statementn" Thus my usage of the term "proposition"
is a natural one. IS I have not constructed a "straw man"
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concept in order to refute Kripke's claim that the notion
of a proposition is stretched to the breaking point in
cases like Pierre's and Jones'. With this in mind, let
us finally turn to this problem.
How is the above notion of a proposition "threatened"
in a situation like Jones' and Pierre's? Again, the general
argument in "A Puzzle About Belief" rUl1S as follows. It
is not clear that coreferential proper names are not
interchangeable, salva veritate, in belief contexts.
The typical arguments purporting to show that they are
not interchangeable rely on the strong disquotation
principle. This principle is one of what Kripke calls
"our normal Inethods of attributing belief." It codifies
our actual practices of attributing belief. However, while
these practices may 'work in most cases (says Kripke) ,
they "break down" in cases like Pierre's (and'perhaps
even in situations like Jones'). In Pierre's case, we
simply can't attribute belief or disbelief accurately on
the basis of these principles. ~Jhile we can usuallj'
infer correctly from a person's dissent from the sentence
"London is pretty", that he does not believe that London
is pretty, we can not correctly do this in Pierre's case
(again, Kripke only argues for the weaker claim that we
may not be able to correctly infer that Pierre doesn't
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believe that London is pretty). Thus arguments that
depend on these principles do not establish that co-
referential proper names are not substitutable, salva
veritate, in belief contexts. As I said earlier, I
agree with all of this. But how do whatever conclusions
we might corne to concerning the disquotation principle
or the question of the substitutivity of proper names in
belief contexts "threaten" the very notion of a propo-
sition? The disquotation principles and perhaps other
methods of attributing belief seem to be what are
threatened, not the notion of a proposition itself.
Perhaps the best procedure is to look a bit more closely
at the relationship between my notion of a proposition
and questions concerning the substitutivity of coreferen-
tial proper names in belief contexts.
Earlier I compared sentences like (76) to gram-
matically similar sentences like (77).
( 76) (3x) (Jones believes x).
(77) (3x) (Jones loves x) .
The second sentence is true if and only if there is at
least one object that satisfies the open sentence (78).
(78) Jones loves x.
The "x" in (78) is transparent in the sense that if we
replace it with any expression which denotes an object
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that satisfies (78), we get a true sentence. For example,
suppose that Mary satisfies (78). By replacing "x" in
(78) with "Mary," we get the true sentence (79).
(79) Jones loves Mary.
And, if lithe tallest woman in the country" also denotes
Mary, we can get the true sentence (80) by replacing U x "
with "the tallest woman in the country."
(80) Jones loves the tallest woman in the
country.
My notio~ of a "proposition ll involves treating the
"X" in (81) as transparent in the above sense, and hence,
taking IIthat ll clauses to denote the things, the propo-
sitions, which Jones believes.
(81) Jones believes x.
So if "that Cicero was bald" denotes an object (proposi-
tion) which satisfies (81), we can obtain the true sentence
(82) by replacing "XU in (81) with "that Cicero was bald .. "
(82) Jones believes that Cicero was bald.
And if limy favorite proposition" denotes the same thing as
"that Cicero was bald," then (83) is also a true sentence.
(83) Jones believes my favorite proposition.
It is not easy to see precisely how the nction of
a proposition is related to the question of whether co-
referential proper names are interchangeable, salva
veritate, in belief contexts. For example, consider the
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two "that" clauses "that Cicero was bald" and "that
Tully was bald." If we assume that these two clauses
denote the same proposition, it follows that the occurance
of "Cicero" in (82) may be re.placed, salva veritate, with
the coreferential proper name "Tully.1i Replacing "Cicero"
with "Tully" yields the sentence (84).
(84) Jones believes that Tully was bald.
Since we have assumed both that the two "that" clauses
in (82) and (84) denote the same proposition and that the
"x" in (81) is transparent, it follows that (82) and (84)
have the same truth value. But is the reverse true?
Does it follow from the fact (supposing that it is a fa"ct)
that "Cicero" and "Tully" are interchangeable, salve
veritate, in belief contexts that the corresponding "that"
clauses denote the same proposition? There is some reason
to think that Kripke believes that it does follow. In
the preface to Naming and Necessity, he says,
A final issue: Some critics of my doctrines,
and some sympathizers, seem to have read them
as asserting, or at least implying, a doctrine
of the universal substitutivity of proper
names. This can be taken as saying that a
sentence with "Cicero" in it expresses the
same "proposition" as the corresponding one
with "Tully," that to believe the proposition
expressed by the one is to believe the propo-
sition expressed by the other, or that they
are equivalent for all semantic purposes.18
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However, it is just not obvious th~~ the assumption that
coreferential proper names are; interchangeable, salve veritate,
in belief contexts entails that a sentence with "Cicero" in
it expresses the same "proposition" as the corresponding one
with "Tully" (or, in my terminology, that the corresponding
"that" clauses denote the same proposition). To see this,
let's suppose that "Cicero" and "Tully" ar3 indeed inter-
changeable, salva veritate, in belief contexts. If (82) is
true, then so is (84) o. On my account of proposi'tions, it
does follow that "that Cicero was bald" and IIthat Tully was
bald" both denote objects, i.e., propositions, which satisfy
the open sentence (81) (if 82 and 84 are true). But nothing
I have said in introducing the term "proposition ll entails
that the two "that" clauses denote the same proposition. It
is consistent to maintain that they denote different propo-
sitions, both of which happen to satisfy (81). Thus we are
not justified, in lieu of some further arguments, in assuming
that if coreferential proper names such as "Cicero" and IITully"
are interchangeable, salve veritate, in beliefs contexts,
then the "that" clauses containing them denote the same
proposition.
Should we infer from this that the notion of a
proposition employed in this discussion is simply not
55
what Kripke has in mind in the above quotation? As I
said before, this is possible. But I don't think that
supposing that he means something else will help.
Suppose that Kripke is using the expression "proposition,"
not for what is asserted or believed (i.e., in my sense),
but for the other possible candidate which I have men.-
tioned, the meaning of a sentence. If so, Kripke's claim
in the quotation can be rendered as follows:
(Ml) "Cicero" and UTully" are interchangeable,
salva veritate, in propositional attitude con-
texts if and only if "Cicero was bald" and
"Tully was bald n have the same meaning.
Since the only difference between the two sentences
"Cicero was bald" and IITully was bald" is that one has
IICicero ll where t.he other has "Tully," it would seem plau-
sible to attribute any difference in meaning between the
sentences to a difference in meaning between "Cicero" and
"Tully." If this is correct, then (M2) is true (if (~1l)
is) •
(M2) "Cicero" and "Tullyllare interchangeable,
salva veritate, in propositional attitude con-
texts if and only if "Cicero" and "Tully" have
the same meaning.
(M2) is an interesting claim. In fact, I will dis-
cuss some aspects of it in the Appendix to this paper.
It is widely taken for granted that if two expres-
sions are synonymous, they are interchangeable, salva
veritate,.in all propositional attitude contexts. It is
r
I
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not so clear, however, t.hat if two expressi,ons are inter-
changeable, salva veri tate, in propositional attitude con-
texts they have the same meaning. It is not obviously
inconsistent to maintain both that IICicero" and "Tully"
are interchangeable, salva veritate, in propositional
attitude contexts, and also tIl.? I" ~' :!.y are not synonymous.
However, regardless of whether (M2) is true, there
is a more serious problem with attributing to Kripke the
position that propositions are the meanings of sentences.
In the quotation live been discussing, he says that if
"Cicero" and "Tully" are everywhere interchangeable,
tn.en .. to believe the proposi tion expressed by one
("Cicero was bald") is to believe the proposition
expressed by the other ("Tully was bald").11 Unfortunately,
as we saw earlier, it does not make sense to say that
Jones r or anyone else, believes (or knows, asserts, or
says) the meaning of the sentence "Cicero was bald. II
Meanings of sentences can not be, at least in this sense,
objects of belief or assertion or any of the other
.. 1 · d 19propos1t10na att1tu es.
It is tempting to respond to all of this by con-
ceding that Kripke is using the \"ord IIproposi tion" in
an unclear and perhaps confused manner, and that he has
failed to make the rather important distinction between
what is asserted or believed, etc. and the meaning of a
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sentence. But even if we grant that Kripke is using
the expression "proposition" loosely, it is still dif-
ficult to see why he thinks that his arguments concerning
the substitutivity of coreferential proper names show
that the notion of a proposition is in danger of breaking
down in cases like Jones' and Pierre's. The problem is
that no matter whether we can or can not substitute co-
referential proper names, salva veritate, in belief con-
texts, th~s doesn't throw any additional doubt on the
truth of sentences like "~x)(Jones believes X)." In
argming for the truth of this sentence, I took no position
on the question of the suLstitutivity of coreferential
proper names in belief or any other propositional
attitude contexts. To illustrate this, suppose that one
can indeed substitute "Cicero" and IITully,1I salva
veritate, in all propositional attitude contexts. Even if this
is 90, "that Cicero was bald ll and "tllat Tully was bald ll
might denote different propositions. Nevertheless,
it is granted that both the "that" clauses denote some
proposition that satisfies the open sentence "Jones
believes x. II Similarly, SUPPoS(~ that one can not substi-
tute "Cicero" and "Tully" in all propositional attitude
contexts. This entails that "that Cicero was bald" and
"that Tully was bald" denote different propositions.
But this is to grant "that they do denote some propositioni that
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is·, that (assuming that Jones believes that Cicero was bald)
there is at least one object, i.e~ proposition, that
satisfies the open sentence "Jones believes x." Again,
we are led to the conclusion that there are things which
I, and others, call "propositions" and which are the
objects of belief.
So, it is possible to maintain that I~X) (Jones
believes x)" is true regardless of the position one
takes on the question of whether "Cicero" and "Tully"
are interchangeable, salva veritate, in belief contexts.
Consequently, Kripkers argument that we don't know whether
Jar not such substitution is possible does not, in itself,
give us any reason to doubt that there are such things
as propositions which are the objects of belief and the
other propositional attitudes. In this sense, Kripke
has given no reason to think that the notion of a propo-
sition is in danger of brea~ing down in cases like
Pierre's and Jones'.
Here is another way of viewing the situation.
My argument for the existence of things which are the
"objects!' of the propositional attitudes, weak as it rna~T
be, began with the assumption that sentences like "Jones
believes that Cicero was bald" are sometimes true. ~~hat
Kripke has done by throwing doubt on the disquotation
principles and, thus, showing that we don't know whetller
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coreferential proper names are interchangeable, salva
veritate, in belief contexts, is to show that it is not
clear under what circumstances sentences like the one
above are true. Is it true if Jones says (sincerely,
etc.) "I believe that Cicero was bald"? Is it true if
he says "I believe that Tully was bald but not that
Cicero was bald"? Is it true if he points to a nearby
statue of Cicero and says "I believe that he was bald ll ?
\ve may grant that these are difficul t and "vexing"
questions. But to argue that it isn't clear under what
circumstances sentences like "Jones believes that Cicero
was bald" are true is not to argue that they are not at
least sometimes true. If Kripke had argued this, his
views would be quite· a bit less popular. And, if they
are sometimes true, then my argument, which makes no
use of any disquotation principles and takes no position
on questions of substitutivity, can proceed unaffected
in any obvious way by Kripke's worries. As far as
Kripke's problems are concerned, it doesn't matter
whether we even try to introduce the term "proposition"
in the first place. The questions concerning the substi-
tutivity of coreferential proper names and the disquo-
tation principles are extremely difficult, and remain~
Of course, this does not mean that there are no
problems with my rather simpleminded way of introducing
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the term "propositions." And, while I mentioned several
potential difficulties earlier, an even more notorious
problem remains. I have said nothing about how indi-
vidual propositions are to be identified and distinguished
from each other. In other words, I have not supplied a
set of II identity condi tions II for the notiorl. However,
providing a satisfactory set of identity conditions has
proved to be an extraordinari~y difficult task, and I wi:l
not attempt to do so. Furthermore, while my introduc-
tion o,f the notion of a "proposi tion" is perhaps incom-
plete and inadequate in this sense, Kripke has not
explained how his problems concerning Pierre might affect
the search for a set of such conditions. So even if we
interpret h.is claim that the notion of a "proposi tion"
breaks down in cases like Pi'2rI'e' s and Jones I extrE~mely
generally to IT,ean that something about those cases shows
that it will be more difficult or impossible to provide
a principle for individuating various propositions, it
is still unclear how anything about Kripke's Euzzl~
itself makes the notion of a "proposition" incoherent, or
untenable in some other way.
Thus I conclude that the notion of a IIproposi.tion II
which I have introduced is not IIthreatened" or "strained"
in any obvious way by anything that Kripke infers from
61
his puzzle. However, while I think that he is incorrect
in drawing this general moral from the puzzle, several of
Kripke's other remarks suggest some interesting points
about propositions. Before I go on to discuss what other
philosophers have had to say about the puzzle, I want
rather briefly to make some, I hope, not uninteresting
points about my introduction of the term "proposition"
and some of the uses which might be made of that notion.
III
Kripke safs that just as any theory of "truth must
take the Liar ppradox into account, so must any theory
of belief take his puzzle into account. He also says,
in the passage from which I quoted earlier, that the
questions of what propositions are expressed by "simple"
sentences containing proper names, and whether these
propositions are lIobjects of belief" are vexing questions,
especially when we consider puzzling Pierre. These
remarks, and others, strongly suggest that the questions
of whether there are such things as "propositions" and
of whether these "propositions" are the lIobjects of
belief" are distinct. Kripke's comments suggest that he
thinks that there may be such things as propositions and
yet these things might fail to be "objects of belief. 1I
This is where theories of belief would seem to be impor-
tant. Apparently, Kripke believes that a theory of
belief must, among other things, at least tell us whether
propositions (assuming that they exist) are "objects of
belief" and, if they are not, what are. I want now to
argue that this way of thinking about propositions,
though common, is misguided.
- - h fbI- f 70F1rst of all, what 18 a t eory 0 e 1e ?
course, a theory of belief might simply be taken to be
a set of sentences which, in some sense, are about belief.
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In modern philosophical practice, however, theories of
belief have usually taken the following form:
(Ta) John believes that p if and only if
Here lap" is taken to be a schematic letter and is to be
replaced with sentences of English. Different theories
of belief will fill in the blank after the lIif and only
if" in different ways. For instance, one theory would
be the following.
(Bl) John believes that grass is green if
and only if John gives his ~incere, reflec-
tive (etc.) assent to II grass is green. '121
This theory, which is similar to, but not identical
with, the strong disquotation principle, is false. If
John speaks only German, he will not give his sincere,
reflective assent tOI .. grass is green." rJevertheless,
John, like many other people who speak languages other
than English, might well believe that grass is gr£en.
Here's another theory.
(B2) John believes that grass is green if
and only if John bears some relation, call
it "R,II to an object which is the proposi-
tion that grass is green.
I think that this theory may well be true. If there are
such things as propositions, then the relation R will
just be that of belief, i.e., of believing the proposition
that grass is green.
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It often seems to be taken for granted that there
can only be one true theory of belief. However, it is
not at all clear that there are not several (perhaps
even many) correct ways of filling in the blank in (Ta)
resulting in several true theories of belief. To
illustrate this, let me briefly discuss a debate which
took place some years ago between Alonzo Church and
Rudolph Carnap. In his article, liOn Carnap's Analysis
of Statements of Assertion and Belief," Church argues
that it will not be possible to give a theory (or
analysis) of belief that fills in the blank in (TB ) with
some description of a relation between a person, Jones,
and a sentence which replaces the schematic letter p.
He says:
For statements such as (1) Seneca said that
man is a rational animal and (A) Columbus
believed the world to be round, the most
obvious analysis rrakes them statements about
certain abstract entities which we call
"propositions" • . . namely the proposition
that man is a rational animal and the propo-
sition that the world is round; and that these
propositions are taken as having been respec-
tively the object of an assertion by Seneca
and the object of a belief by Columbus. ~Je
shall not discuss this obvious analysis
"here ... our purpose is to point out what
we believe may be an insuperable objection
against alternative analyses that undertake
to do away with propositions in favour of
such more concrete things as sentences)2
~~
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In liOn Belief Sentences--Reply to Alonzo Churc}l,"
Carnap has the following to say in response:
Church entertains the view that a belief
must be construed as a relation between a
person and a proposition, not a sentence,
and that therefore only the first form, like
(i) [. John believes that the earth is round ,J
is adequate, not the second, like (v) £.John
has the relation B to lithe earth is round il as
a sentence of English.] I do not reject the
first form, but regard both forms as pos-
sible. I do not think that the arguments
offered by·Church so far sh~w the impossi-
bility of the second forrn. 2
Thus Carnap grants that Church has discovered a problem
with his analysis, but feels that it isn't an inRur-
mountable difficulty. Carnap still thinks that an
analysis (theory) of belief in terms of sentences is
possible. 24
What is interesting from the perspective of this
paper is that Carnap explicitly states that he believes
that both analyses (or theories), one in terms of propo-
sitions and one in terms of sentences, are possible.
Furthermore, Church himself, wllile he does not think
that a correct analysis of belief in terms of "such con-
crete things as sentences" is possible, gives no reason
to doubt that there might be other true theories of
belief. For example, later ·in this paper, I will discuss
the view of Ruth Marcus that "belief is a relation
between a person and a state of affairs." Perhaps Churc11
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would find .. states of affairs, II wha,tever they may be, to
be acceptable in a theory of belief. In contrast, most
philosophers talk as if we have to make a choice. Either
belief is a relation between a person and a proposition,
or it is a relation between a person and a sentence, or
it is a relation between a person and something else,
perhaps a "state of affairs." But this need not be so.
It may be possible to analyze belief as a relation
between people and propositions and as a relation between
people and sentences and perhaps even as a relation
between people and states of affairs. It is misguided for
philosophers, a priori, to conceive of their task as a
search for lithe way" in which a person is related to
on~ particular kind of object. As Carnap quite percep-
tively points out, several correct analyses or theories of
belief may be possible.
This isn't the only manner in which this common
way of thinking about belief and propositions is confused.
Another closely related misconception is the vie~! that
there may be such things as propositions and yet those
"mysterious abstract entities" are not the "objects of
belief. II Kripke himself suggests that this view lias
some plausibility when he says that it is a "vexing
question II whether proposi tions (assuming tllat tlley exist)
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are the objects of belief. In order to see how ill
conceived this view is, let's examine the expression
"object of belief." It has been understood in at least
two ways. Some consider something to be an object of
belief just in case belief is correctly analyzed as a
relation between a person and that object. For example,
sentences have been called the true objects of belief
(rather than propositions) by people who hold that it is
possible to give a corre~t analysis of belief in terms
of sentences. However, there is another natural way of
understanding "object of belief." This is to take some-
thing to be an object of belief just in case it is
believed (or perhaps, could be believed). This is analo-
gous to maintaining that some~hing is an object of my
desire just in case I desire it. In this sense, something
will be an object of my desire just in case it satisfies
the open sentence "Jack Cobetto desires x. n Of course,
this is re~iliniscent of the way in which I introduced the
term "proposition" in the first place. We called something
a "proposition" just in case it is (or could be) believed,
in the sense that it satisfied (or could satisfy) open
sentences like "John believes x."
What is important to notice is that on either
reading of "object of belief," it is obviously true that
propositions (in my sense) are indeed objects of belief.
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On the second reading, it is· simply tautologous to say that
propositions are objects of belief. Something is an
object of belief in that sense if and only if it is (or
could be) believed in the sense that it satisfies (or
could satisfy) open sentences like IIJohn believes x."
But that is how we defined the term "proposition,."
As for the first reading of "object of belief," it is a
simple matter to correctly analyze belief as a relation
between a person and a proposition. Consider the following
form of an analysis of belief.
(BF) John believes that grass is green if
and only if John be~rs R to the proposition
that grass is green.
If R is simply taken to be the relation of belief, then
the resulting analysis is clearly correct. It is true
that John believes that grass is green if and only if
John believes (bears R to) the proposition that grass
is green. Perhaps this is why Church calls the analysis
of belief in terms of propositions "obvious. 1I Of course,
while it may be obvious that propositions are objects of
belief in this sense, it must be remembered that it is
possible that other things, such as sentences, may also
be objects of belief in this sense.
I would like to conclude this discussion with one
further example of how the "theory" that propositions
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are the objects of belief can be and has been
stood. It is widely held that the follot 'iirlg "l
tional attitude" sentences are ambiguous:
(8S) John believes that the president is wise.
(86) John asserted that the president is wise.
(87) John knows that the president is wise.
If the definite description lithe president" is read with
small scope, the sentences receive what is called tlleir
aide dicta" interpretations. If it is read with large
scope, the sentences receive their so-called "de re"
interpretations. It is often asserted that the de dicta
interpretations of these sentences assert or express a
relation between a person and a proposition, i.e., the
proposition that the president is wise.
r do not- want to dispute this. Iiowever, the notion
of a proposition is often used to explain the de dicta--
de re aistinction. For example, if a person, say Alfred,
did not know anything about Russell's notion of scope and,
as a perhaps not too ignorant layman, had not noticed that
the propositional attitude sentences are ambiguous, it is
thought that one could make him understand the ambiguity
by appealing to the notion of a proposition. In fact,
Kripke does something suggestive of this in the beginning
pages of .. A Puzzle About Belief. II lie says,
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The contrast, according to the Millian view,
must come in the de dicta or I! small scope"
reading, which is the only reading, for
belief contexts as well as modal contexts,
that will concern us in this paper. If
we wish, we can emphasize that this is our
reading in various ways. Say, "It is neces-
sary that: Cicero was bald" or, more expli-
citly, liThe following proposition is
necessarily true: Cicero was bald ... 11 25
Kripke may be correct in holding that IIJohn believes
the proposition: the president is wise" emphasizes the
de dicta reading of (85). However, appealing to the notion of
a proposition (in my sense) will not help a person, like Alfred,
who doesn't already grasp the ambiguities in (85)-(87) to
understand them. Such an appeal will not enable Alfred
to recognize the kinds of circumstances in which each of
the readings of (85)-(87) is true. To see this, suppose
that we inform Alfred that the de dicta interpretation
of (85) is true if aud only if John believes the propo-
sition: that the president is wise. Since Alfred, we
may suppose, does not know how the term "proposition" is
being used, he will ask for an explanation. We will
then inform him of the manner in which we introduced
and defined the term. However, since we inferred the
'0
existence of propositions from the truth of sentences
like (85)-(87), the explanation we are giving to Alfred
employs the very kinds of sentences about which he is
unclear. If he is alert, he will respond that he isn't
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sure that he correctly understands some of the sentences
used in our explanation, i.e., (85)-(87).
Thus the notion of a proposition, in my sense, can
not be used in the above manner to eXElain the de aicto-
de re distinction. Again, this doesn't mean that the
sentence "John believes the proposition that the presi-
dent is wisen can 110t be used to emphasize or suggest
the de dicta interpretation of (85) 8 Furtherrncre, this
doesn't rule out the possibility that some other notion
of a proposition might enable a person to grasp the
de dicta-de re ambiguity. Finally, I don't intend to
assert that my notion of a proposition and the claim
that propositions are objects of belief possess no
explanatory power. My only point is that it is not
clear what uses (if there are any) it might have.
) '-'
IV
Several philosophers have attempted to solve
Kripke's puzzle. In particular~ Tom McKay, Igal Kvart,
William Lycan, and Ruth Marcus have all proposed dif-
ferent theories of belief in their attempts to resolve
the paradox. McKay takes belief to be a relation between
a person and a propositionu Both Kvart and Lycan offer
(distinct) theories which analyze belief as a relation
between a person and a particular sentence A Marcus
claims that belief is an "epistemological attitude
towards" a "state of affairs. 1I However, if what I've
said in the preceding section of this paper is correct,
it is not clear that these IItheories" are incompatible.
Furthermore, while all of the solutions which I will
discuss advocate different theories of belief, it is
interesting that they all reject the same premises of
Kripke's paradox. With this in mind, let's examine
these purported solutions.
In his article liOn Proper Names in Belief Ascrip-
tl
tions 1" McKay offers a solution whic11 is nearly identical
· 26 .. · h d· · fto m~ne. He beg1ns h1S paper W1t a ~SCUSS10n 0
indexical expressions such as "1," "you," "he," IIthis,U
and II that. .. After examining the ways in which t11ese
expressions are used in various contexts, he argues for
the same distinctidn insisted upon by Cartwright, Strawson,
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Lemmon, and (says McKay) Kaplan. He concludes that we
must distinguish what is asserted by uttering a sentence
in a particular context from the meaning of the sentence
whicll was uttered. McKay uses the term "sentential
meaning" for the meaning of a sentence and the term
II content" for what I have called a "proposi ti.on," i. e. ,
what is asserted.
McKay then goes on to point out that, interestingly',
two sentences can have the same sentential meaning and
can be used to assert or indicate belief in the same
proposition even though a person who understands both
sentences may not realize this. For instance, IILondres
est jolie ll and "London is pretty" have the same meaning
and can be used to make the same assertion or to indicate
a belief in the same proposition, i.e., that London is
pretty. But Pierre doesn't realize this. He believes
that London is pretty, yet he is not willing to indicate
his belief in that proposition by assenting to "London
is pretty. II I
Thus McKay contends that the strong disquotation
principle is false, and, since Pierre also believes that
London is not pretty, that Pierre has contradictory
beliefs. In the concluding paragraph of his paper,
McKay stat.es,
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Language is a great resource for entertaining
propositions, yet in its very virtue, that
this can lead us to new beliefs, lies our
problem. Language can lead us to contra-
dictory beliefs without providing the immedi~
ate resources for removing the contradiction.
Our grasp of a name on a particular occasion
can be a sufficient basis for a belief about
its referent and yet be an insufficient
basis for determining all of the co-reference
relations of that use with other uses of
~arnes that we grasp.27
Clearly McKay is rejecting the premise of the puzzle
(Principle C) that states that if a person has contradic-
tory beliefs, then he is, in p~inciple, in a position to
tell through the use of logic alone that he has contra-
dietary beliefs. Thus McKay solves both the stronger
version and the weaker version of' the puzzle in the same
way that I solve them. Both the strong disquotation
principle and principle C must be rejected.
However, while McKay and I agree about which
premises of the puzzle must be rejected, I want to mention
several of McKay's positions with which I do not agree.
First, McKay fully accepts and defends the IIdirect
reference" theory of names which states that a proper
name "has no connotation, but refers directly, without
any semantic contribution from a::»;;ociated properties. 'I
Thus he accepts the view that two people utte~ing the
sentences "Cicero was bald II and "Tully was bald ~I make
assertions that have the same content (in my terminology,
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that IIthat Cicero \vas bald ll and "that Tully was bald"
",
denote the same proposition). He accepts the view that
coreferential proper names are indeed interchangeable,
salva veritate, in belief contexts. I want to emphasizt
tllat I do not take this strong pasi tian and, furthermore,
that it is not necessary to take a position on this
question to solve the puzzle. Solving the puzzle in the
way in which both McKay aIld I advocate (rej ecting the
strong disquotation principle) may indeed considerably
weaken the most infll~ential argument pl~rporting to
refute the IIdire'-t reference ll theory of names. But
that does mean that there are no problems with the
theory and that we ought to be in a hurry to embrace it.
Also, McKay seems to misunderstand the general
significance of the puzzle. He says,
And Saul Kripke, the leading promoter of
the view that names lack connotation, has
found the direct reference view contributing
to a puzzle about belief. 28
and also,
In IIA Puzzle About Belief ll Kripke con-
siders a slightly different argument
against the conclusion that proper names
are devices of pure reference in belief
contexts. 29
In fact, this simply isn't the way in which Kripke views
the puzzle. He does not consider it to pose a problem
for the IIdirect reference ll theory of proper names. Indeed,
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as I argued earlier, Kripke believes that the puzzle
supports the "direct reference ll theory. He take the
puzzle to show that a widely (almost univerGally)
accepted view about belief, which is seemingly inconsis-
tent with the "direct reference" theory, is unjustified.
The discovery of the puzzle, Kripke says repeatedly,
shows that the simple conclusion that coreferential
proper names are not interchangeable, salva veri tate,
in belief contexts, is "unwarranted. 1I These alleged
failures of substitutivity have sometimes been taken to
establish or at least to suggest that the "direct
r~ference" theory is incorrect. Kripkels argument
rejects the threatening conclusion about substitutivity
and, therefore, purports to support the "direct reference ll
theory of proper namesa
The solutions proposed by Igal Kvart and William
Lycan both analyze belief as a relation between a person
and a sentence. Here is an excerpt from Kvartls article
"Kripke's Belief Puzzle. II
I shall conduct my discussion against a set-
up in which the notion of Ipl being a belief
of r (for a believer r) will playa major
role. My main working hypothesis will
involve taking beliefs as linguistic repre-
sentations. At a given time t a cogni.zer
can be said to be in a certain belief-state,
reflecting whatever beliefs he has at the
time. Such belief-states would .be classi-
fiable via particular beliefs: if Ipl is
a belief of our cognizer r (as I shall call
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our believer from now on) at time t, then r
could be said to be in a 'pi-belief state.
(I will remind the reader that I limit my
discussion in this paper to cognizers with
minimal logical, linguistic and conceptual
acumen) •
Of course, having particular beliefs is a
constitutent of the causal order: the acqui-
sition of beliefs can be caused by various
stimuli, and r's possession of certain
beliefs can cause modes and dispositions
-of behavior, not the least among them would
be his verbal dispositions to assert or to
assent to various sentences, or to refrain
from such assents. Beliefs, being linguis-
tic representations, that is, sentences,
are in one language or another: a cognizer
r may have 'the king is bald,' but not
'Ie roi est chauve,' as a belief of his,
which will be attested to by his disposi~
tion to assent to the first but not to the
second in 'appropriate' circumstances
(which will happen, for instance, when he
knows no French). I~ he would assent to
both in 'appropriate' cirCl~stances, they
would constitute two distinct beliefs of
his. The framework I am working with here
should be contrasted with the theory which
takes beliefsto be propositions. 30
Although Kvart makes some other interesting claims
about belief, the passage above provides sufficient back-
ground to enable one to understand his solution to Kripke's
puzzle.
Here is the analysis of belief that Kvart proposes:
(KB) r believes that p if and only if for some
"q," such that lip" is an adequate paraphrase
of Uq,lI " q " is of belief of r.
In order to facilitate a discussion of this analysis, let
me replace the above (intended) schema with the following
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instance which is of special interest to us.
(KB l ,) Pierre believes that London is pretty
if and only if for some sentence p such that
"London is pretty" is an adequate paraphrase
'of p, sentence p is a belief of Pierre.
Before this analysis can be understood, we must know
both what Kval.-t means by the phrase .. is an adequate para-
phrase of" and when a sentence is a belief of Pierre.
Since Kvart claims that "verbal ~isposition to assent
or not to assent to certain sentences are thus key indicators
for the latter being beliefs," it is plausibl~ to suppose
that Kvart maintains that the sentence "London is pretty"
is a belief of Pierre if and only if Pierre assents to it.
Unfortunately, Kvart is even less clear about what he
means by "is an adequate paraphrase of." However, since
he does consider "Londres est jolie" to be an adequate
paraphrase of "London is pretty" and says also that every
sentence is "of coursell an adequate paraphrase of itself,
it is natural to assume that two sentences are "adequate
paraphrases" of each other just in case they can be used
to assert the same proposition. Fortunately, we need not
settle this because the two assertions just mentioned make
it possible to see how Kvart's solution works.
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Let's examine how Kvart's analysis handles two rela-
tively straightforward and uncontroversial cases. First,
suppose that John is a normal English speaker who speaks
no other language and who assents to the sentence "London
is pretty." 011 Kvart I s view, we can infer that IILondon
is pretty" is a belief of John. Moreover, since there
is some sentence which is an adequate paraphrase of
IlLondon is pretty" (that sentence itself) and which is a
belief of John, it ~ollows that John believes that London
is pretty. This result seems to be correct~ Now suppose
that John speaks only French and that he' assents to the
French sentence "Londres est jolie." Since there is
some sentence p which is an ad~quate paraphrase of
IILondon is pretty" (namely "Londres est jolie") and which
is also a belief of John, it follows, again, that John
believes that London is pretty.
Thus Kvartls analysis of belief gives the correct
answer to the question "Does John believe that London
is pretty?".inthese two unproblematic case!=). But what
does it say about the more complicated case of Pierre?
Kvart says,
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In a nutshell, my resolution of Kripke's
puzzle is as follows: The consistency of a
believer resides in his sorting out purely
logical contradiction from among his beliefs,
given unlimited logical acumen, as Kripke
would agree. 'Londres est joliet and 'London
is 1:not .. ] pretty' are two distinct beliefs,
[ an obvious mista tement·] and no logical acumen
can tell that they are contradictory. (This
is not the case if the beliefs are taken to
be propositions rather than sentences.)
Furthermore: it is possible for 'Londres est
jolie 5 to be ~ belief of r without 'London
is pretty' being a belief of his (despite
l1is logical and linguistic acumen). Given
our analysis of belief-sentences in terms
of beliefs, in this case T believes that
London is pretty' will be true without
qualification, since some adequate para-
phrase of 'pi being a belief of r is suf-
ficient to make 'r believes that pi true,
while no one adequate paraphrase of 'pi which
is not-a belief of r is sufficient to make
'r believes that pi false. Hence non-
assent to 'pl does not entail that r does
not believe that p, which makes Kripke's
Biconditional Form of the disquotational
Principle false. Without ~his principle,
no contradiction follows. 3l
In this passage, Kvart is rejecting the strong disquotation
principle. He claims that while Pierre does not assent to
"London is pretty," Pierre still believes that Londol1 is
pretty because he does assent to IILondres est jolie" which is
both an "ad"equate paraphrase ll of "London is prettyll and is
one of his beliefs. Thus Kvart, as I did, is simply citing
Pierre's case as a counterexample to the claim that if a
normal English speaker believes that London is pretty, then
he will assent to the sentence IILondon is pretty."
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Kvart's solution to the weaker version of the puzzle
is a bit more problematic. He agrees with me that Pierre
believes both that London is pretty and that London is not
pretty since Pierre assents to and has as beliefs both
"Londres est jolie" and "London is not pretty," which are
adequate paraphrases of "I.ondon is' pretty" and IILondon is
not pretty. II But despite this, Kvart maintains that Pierre
does not have contradictory beliefs! He says,
Now the notion of a believer being consistent
or not resides in whether his beliefs yield a
contradiction. It resides in whether the use
of logical tools alone can allow him to derive
a contradiction from the beliefs he possesses,
which is tantamount to whether he has contra-
dictory beliefs. Thus, the subject matter of
his being consistent or not lies at the level
of his beliefs, in whether there is a set of
beliefs of his such as['p', '-P'~; or, more
generally, a set of beliefs of hisi 'Pl"32
..• , 'Pn'!which is self-contradictoryo
Kvart seems to think that a person has inconsistent beliefs
if and only if he can tell by using logical tools alone
that those beliefs (i.e. sentences) lead to a contradic-
tion. While Pierre has the two sentences "Londres est
jolie" and IILondon is not pretty" as beliefs, he could
not logically infer the sentence "London is pretty"
from his "belief-set" of sentences. Thus he ca.n not
determine by logical means that he has inconsistent beliefs.
This account of inconsistency is troubling in
several respects. Suppose that a person, Peter, has the
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sentences "London is pretty" and "London is no't prett.yll
as beliefs. Can he tell "through the use of logic alone"
that these sentences (beliefs) are contradictory? If
he judges them to be contradictory then he is obviously
assuming that "London" refers to the same city in both
sentences. (If he thought it referred to different
cities, he wouldn't judge the sentences to be inconsis-
tent. ) But iSll' t the assumption that "London" refers to
the same city in both sentences, in some sense, "extra-
logical"? After all, logic does not tell Peter t.hat i t
refers to the same city in both sentences. Now suppose
that the person in question is Pierre and the two suspect
beliefs are "Londres est jolie ll and IILondon is not
pretty." Kvart says that if Pierre is to derive a contra-
diction from these two sentences, he must make the Uextra-
logical" assumption that "Londres" and IILondon" refer to
the same city. But if this assumption is lIextra-logical,"
why isnt' Pet:er's assumption that "London" refers to the
same ci ty in both of his beliefs also lIextra.-logical ll ?
It just is not very clear, on Kvart's account of incon-
sistency, when we are entitled to conclude that a person
has deduced or recognized a contradiction lion the basis
of logic alene."
More import~ntly" :n if Kvart is correct in
clairLling that Pierre's beliefs "Londres est jolie ll and
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"London is not pretty" are consistent in the sense that
Pierre can I t derive a contradiction from trLem through
logic alone, there is still an important sense in which
Pierre has inconsistent beliefs. Kvart's analysis of
belief entails that Pierre believes that London is pretty
and also that Pierre believes that London is not pretty.
When Kvart argues that, in spite of this, Pierre does not
have contradictory belief~ I am strongly tempted to
respond that when I say that a person has contradictory
beliefs, I simply mean that, for some sentence p, that
person believes that p and also believes that not p. In
other words, I define IIhas contradictory beliefs" not
in terms of a person's behavior with respect to particu-
lar sentences in his or her "belief-set" (as Kvart does) ,
"but rather in terms of sentences like "Pierre believes
that London is pretty" and IIPierre believes that London
is not pretty." While Pierre may not have cont~radictory
beliefs in Kvart's sense, he clearly has contradictory
beliefs in my sense.
I will not here discuss the questions of whether
other senses of II inconsistent" and "contradictory" exist
(or might be introduced) and of whether any of these
senses are (or would be) preferable. If I hesitate to
adopt Kvart's definitions of "has inconsistent beliefs"
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and "has contradictory beliefs, II it is because they appeal
to his analysis of belief in terms of particular sentences.
In contrast, my definitions of these expressions make no
appeal to any theory Col analY:ais of belief. t'1hile thi.s
seems to me to be a more natural and preferable approach,
it is not important for the purposes of this paper that
we choose one or the other.
However, it is important that our differe~ce in
terminology does not obscure that Kvart and I essentially
agree on how Kripke's puzzle, in both its stronger and
weaker forms, is to be solved. \ve both solve the stronger
version by rejecting the strong disquotation principle.
As regards the weaker version, we both claim that Pierre
believes both that London is pretty and that London is
. not pretty. If one uses "has contradictory beliefs" in
Kvart's sense, then Pierre does not have contradictory
beliefs, and the premise of the weaker version of the
puzzle which claims that he does must be rejected. On
the other hand, if one uses "has contradictory beliefs"
in my sense (which is also, I think, the sense intended
by Kripke), then Pierre does have contradictory beliefs,
and the puzzle is solved by realizing that a person can
have contradictory beliefs without being in a position to
determine this through the use of logic alone.
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The other Usenterltial ll solution to the puzzle is
proposed by William Lycan. I won't try to describe his
complicated theory of belief in all of its detail.
Indeed his article, 1I'"toward a Homuncular Theory of
Believing,1I contains many expressions and claims that
t f 1 · d 1 · d · 33 d '1Jcry au or exp anat10n an e UC1 at10n. Instea, I .
include the following passage in which he lays out, in
broad outline, his view:
Homunctionally: To judge or believe occur-·
rently that P is to have a storage-and-
playback mechanism that in a certain distinc-
tive way harbors a representation whose
syntactic/semantic structure is analogous
to that of the sentence., that replaces liP. II
What makes such a state of affairs a case
of believing that P is the syntactic/semantic
properties the representatj,on shares wi th
the (here, English) sentence in question;
what makes it 2. case of bE~lievina that P is
the distinctive mod~ ,")f IIharborix:ig ll or
storage-playback. This distinctive mode of
storage is what we might otherwise call the
type of functional role played by a belief
qua bellef--the characteristic contribution
that a "believed" representation makes to
the believer's ongoing institutional order of
business. Thus, it is this mode of storage
or type of functional role that will distinguish
beliefs from other propositional attitudes;
and a full specification of the mode of
storage would contain parameters whose values
would determine such interesting features as
belief strength (I take belief strength to
be a matter of the belief's use in explana-
tory inference, the amount and type of callsal
sustenance that it receives from its basing
reascn(s), and its authority in interacting
with other beliefs and desi.res in determining
action) .34
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If this were all that Lycan said about his theory,
it would obviously be quite difficult to extract a clear
analysis of belief sentences. Fortunatley, Lycan adopts
a "semantics for belief-ascription" offered by other
philosophers which is a bit more manageable. Here is
the essential passage.
The sentential account squares with a plausib~e
semant~cs for belief-ascriptions. Sellars,
H~II, and also Davidson (1968) have argued that
the sentential complement of a belief-
ascription serves as a sort of exemplar of what
is said to be believed, the semantical function
of the complernentizer "that" being to ostend
or demonstrate this exemplar. Thus:
1. Jones believes that broccoli causes erysipelas
is to be understood along the lines of
2. Jones believes some-Broccoli causes erysipelas;
where the Sellarsian dot quotes are common-noun-
forming operators that also serve to ostend the
linquistic token that they enclose. A slight
variation would be to express the force of (1) as
3. Jones believes one of those ~cCOli causes
e.rysipelas. EJ ......... v
Thus, in this approach, belief is construed as
a dyadic relation that a person bears to a
linguistic or quasi-linguistic tok6n that falls
into a certain category. I shall not here
rehearse the virtues of this semantical hypo-
thesis, as its proponents have already touted
them at length.
Now, how are we to determine the extension of
the predicate "is a·Broccoli causes ersipelasJ.!?
Alternatively, how are we to tell when some
linguistic or quasi-linguistic token of some
qui te other shape !.! "one of tllose"?
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Differing individuative schemes are possible
here. Davidson merely invokes an unexplicated
relation of IIsamesaying." Sellars (1963)
offers a more elaborate scheme: For him, an
item will count as a-Broccoli causes erysipelas·
just in case that j. tern plays a};)proximately the
same inferential role within its own surrounding
conceptual framework that the sentence
IIBroccoli causes erysipelas" plays within
ours. Other possibilities are available.
We might count a thing as a~roccoli causes
erysipelas-if the thing has the same truth-
condition as does our sentence "Broccoli
causes erysipelas," or if the ttling has the
same truth-condition computed according to the
same recursive procedure. Later on I shall
make special use of this availability gf
alternative methods of individuation. 3
Thus Lycan's analysis of belief is that
(La) Jones believes that broccoli causes
erysipelas if and only if Jones believes
some token of -Broccoli causes erysipelas·.
In order to properly understand this theory of
belief, one must take note of the suprising way in which
Lycan uses the expression "·Broccoli causes erysipelas·. I~
While it is tempting to assume that this expression is
being used to denote or name a sentence, Lycan is really
llsing it as a predicate expression. Moreover, this
expression may have in its extension some sentence tokens
which are not tokens of the sentence "Broccoli causes
erysipelas. II (TI) and (T2) are the two definitions of
the predicate which Lycan offers in the passage above.
(Tl) (x) (x is a token of ·Broccoli causes
erysipelas· if and only if x has the same truth-
conditions as IIBroccoli causes erysipelas ll ).
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(T2) (x) (x is a token of ·Broccoli causes
erysipelas· if and only if x plays the same
inferential role as IIBroccoli causes erysi-
pelas") .
Interestingly, Lycan claims that (TI) and (T2) correspond
to an ambigui ty in belief sentences. ~·1oreover, he
claims that Kripke's puzzle is solved once this ambiguity
is recognized.
However, before I evaluate this claim, I want to
say a word about (Tl) and (T2). (TI) is relatively
unproblematic. There is a long tradition of using the
term IItruth conditions" in the following manner. Two
sentences have the same truth conditions just in case
they attribute the same property or properties to the
same object or objects. For example, "Cicero was bald"
c?nd IITully was bald II have the same truth condi tions
because they both attribute the same property (baldness)
to tIle same object (Cicero, i.e., Tully). It'urthermore,
Lycan's use of "truth conditions" appears to be consistent
\V'i th this tradj. tion 0
In contrast, there is no long tradition of use
surrounding the expression "plays the same inferential
role as. II It would seem that to talk about tIle .. inferen-
tial role" of a sentence would be to talk about the
inferences which different people might ma]ce from that
sentence. For instance, from the sentence "John is a
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lonely bachelor," we n'light infer the sentence "John is
lonelykf or the sentence "John is not married." However,
we would not infer the sentence "John is hungry" from
any of the above sentences. Thus we might conclude that
"John is hungry" plays a different "inferential role" than
the other sentences. UnfortunatelYt while this example
may serve to illustrate what Lycan intends, Lycan does not
offer a general definition of the term. With this in
mind, let's now consider how Lycan's theory is supposed
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to solve Kripke's puzzle.-
Lycan says that there should be no "unequivocal"
answer to Kripke's question nDoes Pierre believe that
London is pretty:" He says that the qu.estion "has a
strong" yes and no IIfeel to it" and that a solution to the
puzzle must explain this "yes and no" feeling. Lycarl
argues that the ambiguity of belief sentences which he
posits explains this feeling. Consider (Ll) and (L2),
which are obtained by combining (Tl) and (T2) with Lycan's
original analysis of belief sentences, (LB).
(Ll) Pierre believesl that London is pretty
if and only if he believes some sentence
token wi th the same truth condi tions as II London
is pretty.1I
(L2) Pierre believes2 that London is pretty
if and only if he believes some sentence
token which plays the same inferential role
as "London is pretty. 37
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Since Pierre believes the sentence IILondres est jolie" and
it has the same truth conditions as "London is pretty,"
(Ll) entails that Pierre believesl that London is pretty.
In contrast, while Pierre believes the sentence
"Londres est jolie," Lycan claims that neither t11at
sentence nor any other sentence which Pierre believes
plays the same inferential role for Pierre as "London is
pretty." Consequently, if Lycan is correct about this,
(L2) entails that Pierre does not believe2 that London
is pretty. Thus the alleged "yes and no" feeling to
Kripkels question is explained by the fact that the
answer is "yes" for the first sense of believe and "no "
for the second sense of belief.
Nevertheless, this purported solution to the puzzle
is inadequate. To see this, suppose that Kripke had asked
the question "Does Pierre believe that London is not
pretty? II Cl,early Kripke might have done this. After
all, the whole point in telling Pierre's elaborate story
is to give us apparently eql1al reason to assert Ai ther "thdC
Pierre believes" that London is pretty or "that Pierre believes"
that London is not pretty. Accordingly, if the question IIDoes
Pierre believe that Londen is pretty?" has a "yes and no"
feeling which must be explained then so does the question "Does
Pierre believe that London is not pretty?"
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However, Lycan's two senses of belief can not
explain the lI yes and no" feeling of the second question.
(Ll) forces us to conclude that Pierre does believel that
London is not pretty because he believes a sentence
that has the same truth conditions as "London is not
pretty. II In fact, he believes that very sentence.
Furthermore, although the term lIinferential role" is
not fully explained, it is obvious that a token of IILondon
is not prettyll plays the same inferential role as itself.
Therefore, since Pierre believes the sentE:nce "London is
not pretty," (L2) entails that Pierre also belives2 that
London is not pretty. But this leaves the "yes and no"
feeling of the question "Does Pierre believe that London
is not pretty?" unexplained, because the answer is "yes"
on either sense of "belief. 1I
It is interesting to note that, while Lycan's
solution clearly does not explain the "yes and no
feeling" to both of Kripke's questions, there is a sense
in which my solution does explain it. In my view, Pierre
believes both that London is pretty and that London is
not pretty. Accordingly, if one is asked whether Pierre
believes that London is pretty, it would be very mis-
leading to say simply "yes." While the resonse may,
strictly speaking, be true, it would have an air of
deception in that II the whole truth II was not conunu11icated.
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Similarly, if one responded to the question "Does Pierre
believe that London is not pretty?1I with a simple "yes,"
an analogous air of deception would arise. While this
explanation may not be as elegant as a solution which
posits an ambiguity in the term "believes," at least it,
unlike Lycan's solution, explains the "yes and no"
feeling to both of Kripke's questions.
Furthermore, if it is not clear that my solution to
I{ripke I s puzzle succeeds -in --explaining the lI yes and no II
feeling of Kripke's questions, the problem may well lie
not in my explanation, but in what is being explained.
The expression nthe yes and no feeling ll is extremely
vague. Lycan does not explain it. He merely introduces
it and then claims that his solution to the puzzle
succeeds in explaining it. Thus until we are given a
better idea of just what it is we are to explain, it
would be more productive to evaluate solutions to Kripke's
puzzle on the basis of whether they succeed in resolving
the specific contradictions of the puzzle. I want now
to show that neither of Lycan's analyses of belief (Ll)
and (L2)' can, in itself, produce an adequate solution
to the puzzle.
(L1 ) seems to entail a solution to the puzzle which
is very similar to mine. As we saw above, (Ll) entails
that Pierre believes both that London is p:retty and ,that
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London is not pretty.- Consequently, (Ll) requir~s
that we give up principle (C) which states that a person
who has contradictory beliefs is in principle in a
position to tell through the use of logic alone that this
is so. Also, (LI) entails that the strong disquotation
principle is false. Pierre believes that London is
pretty even though he doesn1t assent to the sentence
IILondon is ·pretty." Instead he believes and assents to
the sentence nLondres est jolie" which has the same truth
conditions as "London is pretty.1I
However, in spite of this similarity, (LI) has other
consequences which render ,it unsuitable to serve as a
basis of a solution to Kripke's puzzle. Consider my
earlier example about Jones and the sentences IICicero
was bald ll and IITully was bald. 1I Since these two sentences
have the same truth conditions, (Ll) entails that, if
Jones believes that Cicero was bald, he also believes
that Tully was bald. Moreover, since two sentences have
the same truth conditions if they attribute the same
property or properties to the same object or objects
regardless of the manner in whicll the objects are desig-
nated, (LI) entails that coreferential expressions nr~
interchangeable, salva veritate, in belief contexts.
I have argued that, even in lJ3ht 9f Kripkels puzzle,
we should not rush to conclude that coreferential proper
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names are:interchangeable, salva veritate, in belief
contexts. However, the view that any coreferential
expressions are interchangeable, salva veritate, in
belief contexts would be rejected by most philosophers,
even those who are ardent supporters of tIle "direct
reference" theory of proper names.
Lycan's other analysis of belief is just as implau-
sible. As we have seen, (L2) entails both that Pierre
-berieves that London is not pretty and also that Pierre
does not believe that London is pretty. But to accept
this would be to respect Pierre's behavior as an English
speaker (he assents to "London is not prettyll) and to
reject his behavior as a French sp~aker (he assents to
IILondres est jolie. lI ) While I will not repeat his argu-
ment here, Kripke argues powerfully that Pierre's
behavior as a French speaker and· 'Pierre I 5 beha~lior as an
English speaker deserve equal respect. That is, there
is no more reason to conclude that Pierre believes that
London is not pretty than there is to conclude that he
believes that London is pretty. In so far as a proponent
of (L2)' without giving any explanation, only respects
Pierre's behavior as an English speaker, he has failed
to resolve Kripke's puzzle.
Here's another way of stating this objection.
Surely, if (L2) is true, there will be an analogous
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theory, stated in French, which is also true. ~le can
obtain this theory, call it II (L2F ) ," by translating
(L 2 ) into French but replacing IILondon is pretty"
with "Londres est jolie." (This is just what Kripke
does by insisting t11at a IIFrench iii principle analogous
to the strong disquotation principle will be true if the
English principle is true.) If we translate (L2F) into
English, we get that Pierre believes that London is
pretty if and only if he believes some sentence token
that plays the same inferential role as "LondrF2s est
jolie." Since Pierre believes the sentence "Londres
est jolie" and it lias the same inferential role as
"Londres est jolie" (i.e., itself), it follows that
Pierre does believe that London is pretty. But this
contradicts the consequence of (L2) that Pierre does not
believe that London is pretty. Therefore, if Lycan
wants to escape from the contradiction, he must, given
that he accepts (L2), hold that (L2F) is false. But
this is absurd. Surely if (L2) is true, then the analogous
Frenc~ principle is also true. English has no such
special position in the universe of languages.
In "A Proposed Solution to a Puzzle About Belief,"
Ruth Marcus offers a solution which is distinctive in
several respects.38 First, she takes the rather uncommon
position that belief lIis a relation between a person and
96
a state of affairs." Secondly, she maintainE a very
controversial" view which entails, for example, that the
sentence IIJohn believes that 2 + 2 = 5" is never true,
regardless of to whom "John" refers and how ma+..:hematially
inept that person may be. Since this second position is
directly related to one of the premises of Kripke's
puzzle, I'll begin with it.
Marcus argues that belief and knowledge are related
in an interesting and suprising way. She begins by
pointing out that if a person claims that he or she knows
that Cicero ~ Tully, that person is mistakene This is
not controversial, since, in general, one can't know
something that is false. However, Marcus goes on to
claim that just as someone who claims to know something
that is false is mistaken, anyone who claims to believe
something that is impossible is also mistaken. Here is
the passage containing her intuitive argument for that
conclusion.
There is an intuition about belief which I
have (as do others) but which is not so
widely shared. Tha't intuition suggests a
modification of the disquotation principle.
Suppose that someone were to cJ3im that he
believes Hesperus is not identical with
Phosphorus or that Tully is not identical
with Cicero, or that Londres is not the
same as London where in those contexts of use
the names of the "pairs" in question do,
on the theory of direct reference, refer to
the same thing. It is my (non post-hoc)
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intuition that on discovery that those
identi ties hold, and conseql.lently that the
associated name pairs name the same thing, I
would r~t say that I had changed my belief or
acquired a new belief to replace the old, but
that I was mistaken in claiming that I had
those beliefs to begin with. After all~f
I had believed that Tully is not identical
with Cicero, I would have been believing
that something is not the same as itself
and I surely did not believe that, a blatant
impossibility, so I was mistaken in claiming
to have the belief. Nor am I insisting that
I did not have any belief, but only that it
was not the belief that Hesperus is not the
same as Phosphorus, that Tully is not the same
as Cicero, that Londres is not the same as
London. 3q
Needless to say, Marcus has not won many converts. The
consequences of the view that one can1t believe a necessary
falsehood are hard to swallow. For example, if Marcus
is correct, 110 mathematic.ian ever really believed any
of the false axioms or conjectures that have been proposed
over the years (since mathematical falsehoods are neces-
sarily false). IIowever, I will not discuss further whether
Marcus is right about this. Instead, I want to consider
how this view affects Kripkels puzzle.
Marcus states above that her intuitive arguments
suggest that the weaker disquotation principle in Kripke's
puzzle has to be modified. Here is what she suggests.
The analogy between this intuition about belief
claims and the more universally accepted ones
about knowledge is close. Just as a condition
for knowing that p is that p obtains, so a
condition for believing is
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c. If x believes that P, then possible pm
The link between belief and possibility also
suggests a modification of the disquotation
principle A as follows.
D. Again assuming that assent is sincere
and reflective, if (i) a normal English
speaker assents to 'p' and (ii) 'p' lS
a sentence of English and (iii) p is
~ssible,then he believes that p-.---
It follows from C and D given all the assump-
tions, that
E. If a speaker assents to 'p,' then he
believes that p if and only if p is
possible. 40
Interestingly, these modifications do not affect
the puzzle. To see this, suppose that Marcus' modified
principle E is true. Since Pierre assents to the sentence
"Londres est jolie" and this sentence expresses a propo-
sition which is true in some possible world, it follows
that Pierre believes that London is pretty. Similarly,
since Pierre assents to "London is not pretty" and, in
some possible world, London is not pretty, it follows
that Pierre believes that London is not pretty. But
this is the same situation we were in before we used
Kripke's ("unmodified") disquotation principle.
In fact, l1arcus I solution to the puzzle is the
same as the solution which I alld .- everal others have
given. Tha t is, she rej ects the same two premises of
the puzzle. Regarding the weaker version of the puz~le,
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her modified disquotation principle E entails that
Pierre has contradictory beliefs. Hence, since Pierre
can't tell that he does have contradictory beliefs through
the use of logic alone, principle (C) must be given up.
Regarding the stronger version of the puzzle, Marcus,
too, says that the strong disquotation principle is to be
rejected. The fact that some English speaker believes
that London is pretty simply does not entail that that
speaker will assent to "London is pretty." t·1arcus,
just as I do, explicitly cites Pierre as a CQunter-
1 h " ". 1 41exarnp e to t 15 prlnClp e.
Let IS turn to l-larcus I other rather uncommon view.
Here is the passage in which she introduces her theory
that belief "is a relation between a person and a state
of affairs."
Knowing arid believing have been characterized
as "propositional attitudE::.s."The vagaries
of the many uses of 'proposition' have been
a considerable source of epistemological
confusiQn. There is a seemingly naive as
well as much maligned view, to which I
subscribe, Russell's for example, where knowing
and believing are attitudes towards states
of affairs (not necessarily actual), which
may have individuals and attributes as
constituents. The "propositional content"
of a sentence on an occasion of use is (are)
the (those) state(s) of affairs that would
make that sentence true. States of affairs
may be actual, n~i actual, possible, necessary,
even impossible.
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Notice that nothing in this passage rules out the possi-
bility that states of affairs are themselves propositions
(in my sense of "proposition"). Indeed, the passage
suggests that Marcus does believe that states of affairs
satisfy (or could satisfy) open sentences like "John
believes x" and "John knows x." If so, then states of
affairs are propositions.
While this may seem rather innocuous, if one is not
careful, one could be led into difficulties. Marcus says
that states of affairs have actual individuals and
attributes as constituents. Thus the states of affairs
denoted by "that Cicero was bald" and "that Tully was
bald" have the actual man, Cicero, as a constituent.
Now some might be tempted to suppose that the state of affairs
denoted by "that the greatest Roman orator was bald" has
Cicero as a constituent as well. If so, it is also very
t"empting to infer that all three of these "t.hat" clauses
denote the same state of affairs, because these IIthat"
clauses don't seem to differ in any other significant
respect (they all attribute baldness to Cicero) .
However, since the "x" in "John believes x" is transparent
(in the sense I explained earlier), it follows that (88),
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(89), and (90) 1 have the same truth value. 43
(88) John believes that Cicero was bald.
(89) John believes that Tully was bald.
(90) John believes that the greatest Roman
orator was bald.
And, if we take the objects referred to by all denoting
expressions in "that" clauses to be constituents of the
states of affairs denoted by the "that" clauses, then all
coreferential expressions will be interchangeable, salva
veritate, in belief contexts. Of course, these consequences
would not be accepted by most philosophers.
There are several possible responses. First, given
that Marcus is such a strong supporter of the "direct
reference" theory of proper names, she would probably be
willing to assert, like McKay, that "Cicero" and "Tully"
are interchangeable, salva veritate, in belief contexts.
She just wouldn't regard this consequence as a difficulty
for her theory of belief. However, even Marcus would
probably not be willing to assert that all coreferential
expressions, including definite descriptions, are inter-
changeable, salva veritate, in belief contexts. As
we saw, this probelm arises only if the individuals re-
ferred to by definite descriptions in "that" clauses
are taken to be constituents of the states of affairs
that the "that" clauses denote 0 Interestingll' , it was
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Russell, the very philosopher from whom Marcus derives
her view that states of affairs are objects of belief,
who showed how to avoid this position. Briefly, he
asserted that the states of affairs (propositions)
denoted by "that ll clauses containing definite descrip-
tions have as constituents not the denotations of the
descriptions, but rather certain "propositional func-
tions. II Fortunately, Russell's vie\vs about defini te
descriptions are so well-known that it is not necessary
to repeat them here.
Appendix
As I indicated briefly at the beginning of this paper,
the views which Kripke advocates in "A Puzzle about Belief"
are intimately related to his neo-Millian view that proper
names refer "directly" to their referents and are not
synonymous with "associated ll definite descriptions. Some
philosophers have argued that this view entails the obvious
falsehood that coreferential proper names are interchangeable,
salva veritate, in belief contexts. Although Kripke denies
that this is entailed by his views, his main purpose in "A
Puzzle about Belief" is to show that it just is not clear
that coreferential proper names are not interchangeable, salva
veritate, in belief contexts. In this appendix, I want to
examine Kripke's claim that proper names are not synonymous
with "associated" definite descriptions. As is well known,
his argument for this view centers on a difference in the
manner in which definite descriptions and proper names designate
their referents. Proper names, says Kripke, designate their
referents "rigidly," whereas, in general, definite descriptions
designate their referents "accidently" or "nonrigidly." Although
I will explain and make some, I hope, interesting points about
the rigidity argument, my main purpose is to point out another
difference in the manner in which names and some definite
descriptions designate their referents; and I will consider
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some of the advantages and disadvantages in using this differ-
ence to establish the non-synonymy of names and "associated"
definite descriptions.
Precisely how does Kripke's argument that names are not
synonymous with "associated ll definite descriptions go? As
I've said above, it has something to do with the alleged fact
that names are "rigid" designators while definite descriptions,
typically, are "nonrigid" designators. Here is the passage
in Naming and Necessity in which Kripke first introduces the
concept of rigidity.
I wish at this point to introduce something which
I need in the methodology of discussing the
theory of names that I'm talking about. We need
the notion 'identity across possible worlds' as it's
usually and, as I think, somewhat misleadingly called
to explicate one distinction between asking whether
it's necessary that 9 is greater than 7 or whether it's
necessary t~at the number of planets is greater than
7? Why does one show anything more about essence than
the other? The answer to this might be intuitively
"Well, look, the number of planets might have bE'en
different from what it in fact is. It doesn't make
any sense, though, to say that nine might have been
different from what it in fact is.' Let's use some
terms quasi-technically. Let's call something a rigid
designator if in every possible world it designates the
same object, a nonrigid or accidental designator if that
is not the case. Of course we don't require that the
objects exist in all possible worlds. Certainly Nixon
might not have existed if his parents had not gotten
married, in the normal course of things. When we
think of a property as essential to an object we
usually mean that it is true of that object in any
case where it would have existed. A rigid designator
of a necessary existent can be called strongly rigid.
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One of the intuitive theses I will maintain in these
talks is that names are rigid designators. Certainly
they seem to satisfy the intuitive test mentioned
above: although someone other than the u.s. ?resident
in 1970 might have been the u.s. President in 1970
(e.g., Humphrey might have), no one other than Nixon
might have been Nixon. In the same way, a designator
rigidly designates a certain object if it designates
that object l"lherever the object exists i if I in
addition, the object is a necessarY,~existent, the
designator can be called strongly rigid. For example,
'the President of the U.S. in 1970' designates a
certain man, Nixon; but someone else (e.g., Humphrey)
might have been the President in 1970, and Nixon
might not have: so this designator is not rigid. 44
As several philosophers, in particular, Michael Slate,
Hugh Chandler, and George Smith, have pointed out, these
passages and others seem to suggest several non-equivalent
definitions of the term "rigid designator ... 4 5 'I'he test for
rigidity suggested by the second of the above paragraphs seems
to be the following:
A designating expression a is rigid if and
only if
(T,) 'Somebody other than the person (or thing)
who (which) is a might have been a I
expresses a falsehood.
In contrast, the first of the above paragraphs seems to
suggest the following test:
\
A designating expression a is riqid if and
only if
~ ,(T2 ) ex might not have been a
expresses a falsehood. 46
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We can see that these tests, (T
1
) and (T 2), are not
equivalent by considering, for example, the designators lithe
father of W.A. Mozart" and lithe son of Leopold Mozart." Kripke
would argue that it is an essential property of W.A. Mozart
that he came from the very sperm and egg that he did. If he
is right about this (and I will assume that he is), it is false
to say that somebody other than the person who was the father
of W.A. Mozart might have been the father of W.A. Mozart.
However, it seems true to say that the father of W.A. Mozart
might not have been the father of W.A. Mozart. Surely Leopold
didn't have to have any children at all. He might never have
married. Similarly, it is true that someone other than the
person who was the S0n of Leopold Mozart m~ght have been the
son of Leopold Mozart. Wolfgang's mother might have lost him
through some accident before he was born; and his parents might
have had a different baby boy at some later date. But it is
false to say that the son of Leopold Mozart might not have been
the son of Leopold Mozart. As lBve been assuming, Wolfgang
couldn't have had different parents. Thus, according to (T l ),
lithe father of W.A. Mozart" is a rigid designator, but lithe
son of Leopold Mozart" is not; however, according to (T 2),
lithe father of W.A. Mozart" is not a rigid designator, but "the
son of Leopold Mozart" is.
Interestingly, these same problems arise when we consider
another way in which Kripke attempts to explain the notion of
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rigidity. Sometimes he defines rigidity by making explicit
reference to the notion of "possible worlds"; and Chandler
has pointed out that Kripke might intend either of the fol-
lowing definitions:
(PI) A designating expression is a rigid designator
if and only if that expressicn designates the same
object in any possible world in which it designates
any object at all.
(P2) A designating expression is a 'rigid designator
if and only if that expression designates the object
which i~its referent in the actual world in any
possible world in which that object exists.47
As with (T l ) and (T 2), (Pi) entails that "the father
of W.A. Mozart ll is a rigid designator~ but (P2) entails that it
is not. If "the father of W.A. Mozart" designates anything
in some possible world, it designates the person who is, in
that possible world, the father of W.A. Mozart. But, according
to Kripke, that can only be the person who is, in the actual
world, the father of W.A. Mozart. Thus, according to (P 1 ),
lithe father of W.A. Mozart" is rigid. In contrast, although
that expression designates Leopold Mozart in the actual world,
there are lots of possible worlds in which Leopold exists but
does not have Wolfgang as a son. Since the description lithe
father of W.A. Mozart" does not, in those possible worlds,
denote Leopold, "the father of W.A. Mozart" is not, according
to (P2)' rigid.
Given that Kripke has offered these different, non-
equivalent definitions of rigidity, we would seem to have
L
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several options. First, we could treat all of the definitions
as equals, and accept that there is not one concept of rigidity,
but several. Alternatively, we could take the view that there
is one clear concept of rigidity which is intended by Kripke
but is not captured by any of the definitions given above. This
last position is taken by George Smith in his in-depth study of
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rigid designation. Or, finally, we might take one of the
definitions to be "correct," in the sense that it really does
capture what Kripke intends by the term "rigid designator," and
hold that the other definitions were offered only because they
are s<) similar and Kripke did not notice that they were not
equi~7alent0
This last alternative might seem especially unlikely since
it, unlike the other two, requires us to reject one of the
definitions in favor of another. However, even though Kripke
doesn't seem to give any reason for preferring one of the defi-
nitions over the others, I think it is at least plausible to
argue that he, in fact, regards (T i ) as the true test of
rigidity. In his most recent statement of the rigidity
thesis, the preface to the book Naming And Necessity (which
was published after the articles by Slate and Chandler) ,
Kripke gives the following account or rigidity.49 He asks
us to consider the following two sentences:
..-
r
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(1) Aristotle was fond of dogs.
(2) The last great philosopher of antiguity
was fond of dogs.
Kripke says that (I) IItruly describes a counterfactual-
situation" if and only if the same person denoted by "Aristotle"
in the actual world would have been fond of dogs had that si tu-
ation obtained. In contrast, (2), says Kripke, truly describes
a counterfactual" situation if and only if the person who satis-
fies the definite description lithe last great philosopher of
antiquity" in that counterfaetuaJ situation would have been
fond of dogs if that situation had obtained. Kripke takes
this difference to illustrate that IIAristotle" is a rigid
designator, whereas lithe last great philosopher of antiquityll
is not. And, in general, he regards a designator as rigid
if, when it occurs in a simple sentence like (1) or (2),
in deciding whether that sentence truly describes a particular
c6linterfactual situation, we consider only what properties
the person who is denoted by the designator in the actual world
has in that bbtitlt~rfactual- situation.
On this, Kripke's latest elucidation of the nc,tion of
rigidity, it seems to follow, jus't as (TI ) entailed, that lithe
father of W.A. Mozart ll is rigid, but lithe son of Leopold Mozart"
is not. Consider sentences (3) and (4).
(3) The father of W.A. Mozart played the piano.
(4) The son of Leopold Mozart played the piano.
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We have been assuming, with Kripke, that Wolfgang's father
in the actual world is also his father in every possible world.
Thus (3) would correctly describe a counterfactual situation
if and only if the person who is Wolfgang's father in the
actual world would have played the piano had that situation
obtained. In contrast, Wolfgang's mother might have d~cided to
abort him and have another son later on. Thus (4) would cor-
rectly describe a counterfactual situation if and only if the
person vlho satisfies lithe son of Leopold Mozart" in that COtlnter-
factual situation (who might not be Wolfgang) would have played
the piano had that situation obtained. Therefore, since on
Kripke's latest account of rtgidity, as with (T l ) I lithe father
of W.A. Mozart" is rigid and lithe son of Leopold Mozart" is not
rigid, we have some evidence that Kripke really does prefer the
definition offered by (T1 ) over the one offered by (T 2).
However, as I will now try to make clear, regardless of
how one feels about each of the alternatives concerning the
different tests of rigidity, both (Tl ) ~nd (T 2) are equally
useful in establishing that proper names are not synonymous
with their "associated" definite descriptions. Why does the
fact, if it is a fact, that the proper name "Gorbachev" is
a rigid designator, while the lIassociatedll definite description
lithe leader of the Soviet Union" is not, show that they are
not synonymous? There are lots of properties that two synonymous
expressions can fail to share. Why isn't rigidity one of those
III
properties? I think we can see why if we consider the intuitive
tests (TI ) and (T2). By sUbstituting "Gorbachev" for ex in (T I ),
we get:
(5) Somebody other than the .person who is Gorbache"'J
might have been Gorbachev.
Similarly, by substituting "the leader of the Soviet Union" for
CL we get:
(6) Somebody other than the person who is the
leader of the Soviet Union might have been the
leader of the Soviet Union.
When these two sentences are understood taking the first
occurence of the expression replacing n to have large scope,
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we see that they have different truth values. Sentence (5),
understood "de ret" is false, while sentence (6), understood
"de re, II is true. Someone other than Gorbachev nlight have
succeeded Chernenko. But (6) can be obtained from (5) simply
by replacing the occurences of IIGorbachev ll with "the leader of
the Soviet Union." So all we have ,done is to replace one
expression with another expression which is supposed (by the
description theorists) to be synonymous with it; and the result
is a change in truth value. But how can this be? Surely, if
two expressions have the very same meaning, then they ought
to b~ interchangeable, salva veritate, in sentences like (5) and
(6). Thus it would seem that the name uGorbachev" can not be
synonymous with the description "the leader of the Soviet Union"
after all.
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This conclusion seems to me to be correct; but more
importantly for the purposes of this appendix, the above
argument reveals a basic assumption of Kripke's argument for
the view that names are not synonymous with definite descriptionSe
Let me use another example, one which Kripke himself uses, in
order to highlight this assumption. Kripke argues that (7)
(7) Somebody other than Aristotle might have been
Aristotle.
is false, whereas (8)
(8) Somebody other than'Aristotle migh,t have been
the teacher of Alexander.
is true. 51 Again, it seems to follow that "Aristotle" is not
synonymous with "the teacher of Alexander." However, it is
clear that we make this inference only because we are assuming
that if two expressions are synonymous, then they are inter-
changeable, salva veritate, in modal sentences like (5) - (8).
Thus it is the fact that we can't substitute names and their
"associated" definite descriptions in these modal contexts
that makes Kripke's argume~t so compelling.
Once we realize this, it is clear that, regardless of
what significance is given to the fact that Kripke offers both
(Tl ) and (T 2 ) as tests of rigidity, (T l ) and (T 2 ) serve
equally well in the attack on the view that names are synonymous
with "associated" definite descriptions. Consider the sentences
we obtain by replacing Cl in (T 2 ) with "Aristotle" and lithe
teacher of Alexande:c."
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(9) Aristotle might not have been Aristotle.
(10) The teacher of Alexander might not have
been the teacher of Alexander.
While sentence (9) is false, sentence (10) is true. But (10)
can be obtained from (9) simply by replacing occurences of
IIAristotle" with Uthe teacher of Alexander. u Thus those two
designating expressions are not synonymous. This argument is
just as strong as the analogous argument which uses instances
of (TI ) instead of instances of (T2 ). It does not matter that
Kripke has offered both (TI ) and (T 2 ) as tests for rigidity
or even that he might actually prefer (T I ) as a test for
rigidity. The above argument does not even mention the ex-
pression "rigid. designator."
Furthermore, there are even situations in which one of
the two tests is useful in showing that a particular proper
name is not synonymous with an "associated" definite description,
but the other test is not useful. Take the name "Leopold
Mozart" and the definite description nt.he father of Wolfgang
Amadeus Mozart'~" Since most people who l"lave ever heard of
Leopold Mozart think of him as Wolfgang's father, the description
lithe father of W.A. Mozart" is a plausible one to be considered
(by a description theori'st) as synonymous with "Leopold Mozart."
Now consider sentences (11) and (12).
(11) Somebody other than th~ person who was Leopold
Mozart might have been Leopold Mozart.
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(12) Somebody o·ther than the person who was the
father of w.~. Mozart might have been the father
of ~i.A. Mozart.
These sentences are obtained from (T1 ) by replacing L with
"Leopold Mozart" and "the father of W.A. Mozart~" But if
Kripke is correct in holding that W.A. Mozart could not have
had different parents from the ones he actually had, both (11)
and (12) are false. Thus we are not yet in a position to
claim that "Leopold Mozart" is n"ot synonymous with lithe father
of W.A. Mozart."
However, let's apply the other test for rigidity. Consider
the sentences we get by Sllbsti tuting "Leopold Mozart" and
"the father of W.A. Mozart" for Ct in (T 2) •
(13 ) Leopold Mozart might not have been Leopold
Mozart.
(14) The father of W.A. Mozart might not have been
the father of W.~. Mozart.
Sentence (13) is false: but what about (l4)? It seems to
assert that Wolfgang's father, Leopold, might not have been
the father of W.A. Mozart. But this seems to be true. Leopold
might have decided not to have any children, let alone Wolfgang.
Thus here we do have a failure of substitutivity; and, unlike
when we used (Ti ), we are able to conclude that IILeopold Mozart"
is not synonymous with lithe father of W.A. Mozart. 1I
In contrast, here's a situation in which (T1 ), but not
(T ), is useful. Most people who have heard of Caroline
2
Kennedy probably think of her as the daugllter of ,John F.
Kennedy. Thus a description theorist would probably consider
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"Caroline Kennedy" to be synonymous with lithe daughter of John
F. Kennedy." What does (T 2 ) say about this? Sentences (15)
and (16) are the appropriate instances of (T 2).
(15) Caroline Kennedy might not have been
Caroline Kennedy.
(16) The daughter of John F. Kennedy might not
have been the daughter of John F. Kennedy.
Sentence (15) is obviously false; and since Caroline could
not have had different parents, (16) is false as well.
Thus we are not yet able to conclude that "Caroline Kennedy"
is not synonymous with lithe daughter of John F. Kennedy."
Fortunately, (T I ) does enable us to draw this con-
clusion. Consider (17) and (18).
(17) Somebody other than the person who is Caroline
Kennedy might have been Caroline Kennedy.
(18) Somebody other than the person who is the
daughter of John F. Kennedy might have been the
daughter of John F. Kennedy.
Surely (18) is true. President and Mrs. Kennedy might have
decided to abort Caroline and have another daughter at a later
date. Therefore, since (17) is obviously false, (T 1 ) does
allow us to conclude that "Caroline Kennedy" is not synonymous
with nthe daughter of John F. Kennedy."
Keeping all of this in mind, let me now turn to the main
purpose of this appendix. The fact that Kripke's arguments
depend on the assumption that synonymous expressions are inter-
changeable, salva veritate, in modal sentences raises an
interesting question. Could we prove that proper names are
116
not synonyrnou.s wi th their II associa ted" def ini te descr iptions
by pointing out other kinds of sentences in which the names
and their descriptions are not interchangeable, salva veri tate?
I think we can; and the sentences which I want to consider
reveal another difference in the manner in which names and many
definite descriptions denote their referents. Moreover, I will
argue that, although the notion I introduce is, in some ways,
less powerful than Kripke's notion of rigidity, it is immune
to several of the 'objections that have been raised concerning
Kripke's non-synonomy arguments. And, before I introduce this
notion, let me say what several of those objections are.
First, the arguments which I used to establish that
names are not synonymous with their "associated" definite
descriptions depend on our being able to give a large scope,
or "de re~'11 reading to the various instances of Kripke's
intuitive tests, (T 1 ) and (T 2). For example, we concluded
that "Aristotle" is not synonymous with tithe teacher of
"Alexander" because (9), read "de re," is false, while (10)
read "de re," is true. However, some philosophers have argued
that sentences like (9) and (10) can not be given a sensible
"de re" interpretation. Here is how Kripke voices their
concerns.
Some philosophers have distinguished between
essentialism, the belief in modality de re,
and a mere advocacy of necessity, the~elref
in modality de dicta. Now, some people say:
Let I s' give yOU the concept of necessity. A
I
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much worse ~hing, something creating great
additional problems, is whether we can say of
any particular that it has necessary or con-
tingent properties, even make the distinction
between necessary and contingent properties.
Look, it's only a statement or a state of
affairs that can be either necessary or con-
tingent! Whether a particular necessarily or
contingently has a certain property depends on
the ways it's described. This is perhaps
closely related to the view that the way we
refer to particular things is by a description.
What is Quine's famous example? If we consider
the number 9, does it have the property of
necessary oddness? Has that number got to be
odd in all possible worlds? Certainly it's
true in all possible worlds, letPs say, it
couldn't have been otherwise, that nine is odd.
Of course, 9 could also be equally well picked
out as the number of planets. It is not
necessary, not true in all possible worlds, that
the number of planets is odd. For example if there
had been eight planetS, the number of planets
would not have been odd. And so it's thought:
Was it necessary or contingent that Nixon won
the election? (It might seem contingent, unless
one has some view of some inexorable processes
.) But this is a, contingent property of
Nixon only relative to our referring to him as
"Nixon" (assuming "Nixon" doesn't mean "the man
who won the election at such and such a time").
But if we designate Nixon as lithe man who won
the e:ection in 1968," then it will be a necessary
truth, of course, that the man who won the
election in 1968, won the election in 1968.
Similarly, whether an object has the same
property in all possible worlds depends not just
on the object itself but on how it is described.
So it's argued.
It is even suggested in the literature, that
though a notion of necessity may have some sort
of intuition behind it (we do think some things
could have been otherwise; other things we don't
think could have been otherwise), this notion
[of a distinction between necessary and contingent
properties] is just a doctrine made up by some
bad philosopher, who (I guess) didn't realize
that there are several ways of referring to the
same thing.52
·
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Having stated this objection, Kripke goes on to say
the following about why these philosophers think that the
doctrine of modality "de re," i. e., essential ism, is incollerent"
Why have they thought this? While there are
many motivations for people thinking this, one
is thi.s: The qtlestion of essential properties 50-
called is supposed to be equivalent (and it is
equivalent) to the question of I~ identi ty across
possible worlds." Suppose we have someone, Nixon,
and there's another possible world where there is
no one with all the properties Nixon has in the
actual world. Which one of these other people,
if any, is Nixon? Surely you must give some
criterion of identity here! If you have a
criterion of identity, then you just look in the
other possible worlds at the man who is Nixon; and
the question whether, in that other possible world,
Nixon has certain properties, is well defined.
It is also supposed to be well defined, in terms
of such notions, whether it's true in all possible
worlds, or there are some possible worlds in which
Nixon didn't win the election. But, it's said,
the problems of giving such criteria of identity
are very difficult. 53
Kripke's response to these objections is well known.
He argues that people have thought that there is a problem
of "identity across possible worlds" because they have been
thinking about "possible worlds" in a misguided fashion.
He says that we must not think of them as if we IIdiscover"
them by "looking through powerful telescopesa" Rather
they are stipulated by us; and, because we can stipulate what
properties Nixon is to have in some possible world, there
is no problem about identifying him. Although I find this
response convincing, I will not go into this any deeper since
my purpose is only to indicate that the doctrine of "de re"
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necessity, i.e., essentialism, is somewhat controversial.
There is yet another criticism of sentences obtained
from (T1) and (T 2) by replac ing Ct wi,th various proper names.
I have claimed, with Kripke, that these sentences are all,
when read "de re," obviously false. However, some philosophers
who are willing to grant that "de re ll necessity at least makes
sense, actually deny that it is clear that these sentences are
false. They point out that Kripke doesri't give any arguments
for the falsity of these sentences. He merely relies on our
"intuitions." But the people voicing this objection claim that
they just do not have any clear intuitions about what is
and what is not metaphysically possible and, thus, they just
do not know whether these sentences are true or false.
A particularly good example of this type of objection is
given by Douglas Cannon in his doctoral dissertation?4 He asks
us to consider the sentence "Socrates might not have been
Socrates. II Although Cannon agrees that it makes sense to give
this sentence a "de re" interpretation, he argues that it just
is not clear that this sentence, even taking the first occurence
of "Socrates" to have large scope, is false. To show this he
asks us to suppose that (and we don't know that this isn't
what really happened) Socrates actually had an identical twin
brother. Unfortunately, after the original zygotes divided,
the two resul ting zygotes: did not both survive. While tile
zygotes from which Socrates developed successfully implanted
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itself in the uterine wall, the other zygote did not implant
itself and died several hours later. Now, supposing that things
really did happen this way, Cannon asks us to imagine the
following counterfactual situation: The zygote which, in
fact, was Socrates' twin brother successfully implanted itself
in the uter~ne wall and was later born, while the zygote from
which Socrates l in fact, developed did not implant itself and
died a few hours later. Moreover, just as in the actual world,
- .-
the baby's parents named it "Socrates" (or gave it the name
which later on became "Socrates") and the baby grew up to be a
philosopher, drank the hemlock, and did all the other things
we, in fact, attribute to Socrates.
Cannon asks whether this counterfactual situation is
one in which Socrates would not have been Socrates, i.e.,
whether somebody other than the person who actually was
Socrates would have been Socrates. Although Cannon initially
argues that the twin would have been Socrates, he backs off
this claim and says:
I am ready now to retreat a bit. Actually I
do not believe that if Socrates' twin had not
died but had lived and done everything that
Socrates in fact did, then he would be Socrates.
I have no idea who in that case would be Socrates.
And I have been trying to shake your confidence
that you know who would be. I believe that there
is no answering that question. 55
Is Cannon correct? Is there no answering the question
whether the above counterfactual situation is' one in
which someone other than the person who ac~ually was Socrates
f
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would have been Socrates? I must confess that I do not find
this example very convincing. It seems to me that this is
obviously not a situation in which Socrates' actual twin brother
would have been Socrates. Rather, it is a situation in which
Socrates does not exist and somebody else, the twin, is merely
being called "Socrates." But perhaps I'm wrong about this.
Perhaps the reader will have different "intuitions" about this
than I have. Indeed, it is often very puzzling and difficult
to see what grounds we have for asserting either that a par-
ticular property is an essential property of some object or
that it is only a contingent property of that object. But again,
since my purpose is only to point out some features of Kripke's
argument which some philosophers find objectionable, I will not
attempt to settle this dispute.
Both this objection and the earlier one concerninq the possi-
bili ty of giving modal sentences a'" "de re" interpretation are
bypassed by the notion I want to introduce now. Kripke points
out that while proper names denote the same object in all pos-
sible worlds in which they denote anything at all, definite
descriptions often denote different objects in different pos-
sible worlds. However, there is another way in which these
two kinds of expressions differ. Consider the name "Socrates"
and the description lithe President of< the U.S." The name
"Socrates" has always and will always denote the same person,
the man who (we think) taught Plato and drank the hemlock. In
•
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contrast, "the President of the U.5., II although i~·.: presently
denotes Reagan, used to denote Carter and many oth~rs.56 Thus,
while proper names do not denote different objects at different
times, many definite descriptions do. Let me define (as Kripke
does, "quasi-technically") the notion of an "eternal ll designator
as follows: A designating expression is an eternal designator
if and only if it denotes the same object at all times at which
it denotes anything at all. A designator that is not an eternal
designator is a t'emp'ora'ry 'd'esig'nator.
I claim that all proper names are eternal designators,
while, in many cases, their "associated" definite descriptions
are only temporary designators. Moreover, just as Kripke does,
I will give the following two "intuitive tests" which can be
used to determine whether a designator is eternal or temporary:
r-(T3 ) Somebody other than the person who i.s currently
cr was or will be a '
r •(T 4 ) a was not always or will not always be a
If we substitute IIGorbachev" for Ct in (T 3 ) and (T4i, we
get sentences (19) and (20).
(l9) Somebody other than the person who is currently
Gorbachev was or will be Gorbachev.
(20) Gorbachev was not always or will not always
be Gorbachev.
These two sentences, understood tide re," are clearly false.
In contrast, if we replace a. with lithe leader of the Soviet
Union" (the description which I presume most people associate
r
.
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with II Gorbachev", we get (21) and (22).
(21) Somebody other than the person who is currently
the leader of the Soviet Union was or will be the
leader of the Soviet Union.
(22) The leader of the Soviet Union was not always
or will not always be the leader of the Soviet
Union.
Clearly (21) and (22), interpreted "de re," are true! Gorbachev
was not always the leader of the Soviet Union (both Stalin and
Breshnev carne before him): and he will no·t be the leader of
the Soviet Union forever. Thus "Gorbachev" is an eternal desig-
nator, and "the leader of the Soviet union" is a temporary desig--
nator.
It is interesting to note that the two tests, (T 3 ) and
(T4 ), are similar to Kripke's tests for rigidity, (T I ) and
(T2 ), in another respect. In certain situations, they can
give different results. For example, if we replace ~ in
(T 3 ) and (T4 ) with "the biological mother of Caroline Kennedy,"
we get (23) and (24).
(23) Somebody other than the person who is currently
the biological mother of Caroline Kennedy was or
will be the biological mother of Caroline Kennedy.
(24) The biological mother of Caroline Kennedy was
not always or will not always be the biological
mother of Caroline Kennedy.
According to (T3), lithe biological mother of Caroline Kennedy"
is an eternal designator, since (23) is obviously false. In
contrast, according to (T4 ), Uthe biological mother of Caroline
Kennedy" is a temporary designator. Since Mrs. Kennedy did not
..
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have Caroline until some time after she married John F.
Kennedy, she was not always Caroline's mother.
However, just as I argued in the case of rigidity, even
if (T3 ) and (T4 ) sometimes give different results, they are
equally useful for the purpose of establishing that proper
names are not synonymous wi th their "associated. II defini te
descriptions. To see this, consider sentences (19) - (22) againm
(21) and (22) can be obtained from (l9~ and (20), respectivelYi
by substituting lithe leader of the Soviet Union" for occurences
of "Gorbachev" in (19) and (20). But (21) and (22) are true,
while both (19) and (20) are false. Therefore, since these
expressions are not interchangeable, salva veri tate, in temporal
sentences like (19) - (22), "Gorbachev" and its "associated"
definite description lithe leader of the Soviet Union" are not
synonymous. 57 After all, there is surely no reason to think
that a failure of substitution in modal sentences does show
that the two expressions are not synonymous, but a failure
of substitution in temporal sentences does not. My argument,
which is based on a failure of substitution in temporal sentences,
is just as strong a proof that "Gorbachev" is not synonymous
with "the leader of the Soviet Union ll as Kripke's.
In fact, temporal sentences give us an eveR more elegant
way of establishing non-synonomy. Until now, I've been using
sentences obtained from the Kripke-style tests, (T 3 ) and (T 4 ),
in order to establish that "Gorbachev" is not synonymous with
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lithe leader of the Soviet Union." But those sentences are a
bit awkward (especially the phrase "was not always and will
not always ben); and there is no reason why we have to use
them. Others will do just as well. For example, consider
the following sentences:
(25) In 1975, Gorbachev was not Gorbachev.
(26) In 1975, Gorbachev was not the leader of
the Soviet Union.
Interestingly, while (25) is obviously false, (26) is obviously
true. Breshnev, not Gorbachev, was the leader of the Soviet
Union in 1975. However, (26) is obtained from (25) merely
by substituting lithe leader of the Soviet Union ll for the
second occurence of IIGorbachev" in (25). Thus we tlave here
another failure of substitutivity of the name and its lI asso -
ciated" definite description; and, hence, they can not be
synonymous.
Are there any advantages or drawbacks to using temporal
sentences, rather than modal sentences, in arguing that names
are not synonymous with "associated" definite descriptions?
I must admit that Kripke's notion of a "rigid" designator is,
in at least one way, more powerful than my notion of an "eternal"
designator. For there are lots of definite descriptions which
are eternal designators, but not rigid designators. For example,
the description lithe inventol." of bifocals" is an eternal desig-
nator. From the moment it came to denote anything at all, it
has designaged, and will continue to designate, the same person,
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(i.e., Ben Franklin). However, since Ben Franklin might not
have invented bifocals, this description ig not a rigid
designator. Thus we will not be able to argue that the
name IIBen Franklin" is not synonymous with lithe inventor
of bifocals" on the grounds that the naIne is an eternal
designator while the description is a temporary designator.
But we can argue that they are Ilot synonymous on the grounds
that the name is a rigid designator while the description is
not rigid.
However, even if Kripke's modal sentences can prove
non-synonomy in more cases than my temporal sentences, 1 1 m
not sure what should be made of this. After all, even
Kripke can't prove non-synonomy in every case he would like.
For example, suppose that we introduce tl1e name IIHarry" by
stipulating that it is to denote the number 5. I suspect
that Kripke would like to assert that the proper name
IIHarryll does riot have the same meaning as the defini te de-
scription lithe square :':'"oot of 25." He would probably say
that the description lias a "sense" but the proper name refers
"directly" to its referent. But Kripke can not prove this
by appealing to his notion of rigidity. Both expressions
are, according to both (T l ) and (T 2 ), rigid designators.
Furthermore, the description theorists hold, for various
theoretical reasons., that proper names must be synonymous
with definite descriptions, and, hence, that all proper names
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are synonymous with their "associated" definite descriptions.
My temporal argument shows that this view is mistaken. But
once this is granted, it isn't clear what reason there would
be to maintain that there are some cases in which the proper
name is synonymous with, its "associated U definite description.
Thus, even if Kripke is able to prove non-synonomy in more
cases than I can, it isn't clear what the theoretical inter-
est of this is.
More importantly, however, even if Kripke has a few
points on me in the above sense, my arguments involving
temporal sentences are not open to either of the two ob-
jections I mentioned earlier which have been raised against
Kripke's modal arguments. The first objection was that
one can not give modal sentences "de re" interpretations.
That is, one just can not make sense of the idea that an
object has some of its properties essentially, and others
contingently, independent of the manner in which the object
is designated. But look again at sentence (26).
(26) In 1975, Gorbachev was not the leader of
the Soviet Union.
Surely no one would claim that (26) does not ma}{,e sense!
The problems concerning "possible worlds" and lI'transworld
identity" are not relevant here. All that (26) asserts is
that, in 1975, ~ particular man did not have a particular
propertYe In general, all that my temporal sentences, when
understood "de re," would seem to commit us to is the
I
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view that some objects endure through time while retaining
some of their properties and losing othe·...s~ While there
may be philosophers who object to this, many of the philoso-
phers who raise objections about "identity across possible
worlds 11 and ques"tion the coherence of essentialism would not
challenge these seemingly less controversial commitments~
How does my argument fare against Cannon's objection?
He claims that Kripke hasn't established that names are
rigid designators because it just is not clear that no
one other than the person who actually was Socrates could
have been Socrates. However, while I will admit that it
isn't always clear what our grounds are for holding that
a particular property (being Socrates) is essential to an
object, this type of objection has no effect on my temp0ral
arguments. All that I need to do in order to establish
that "Gorbachev" is not synonymous with its "associated"
definite description, lithe leader of the Soviet union," is
to show that (25) differs in truth value from (26). But
this is simple. Surely no one (unless he has an almost
unbelievable distrust of the Soviet Union's leadership)
would claim that Gorbache~ not Breshne~ was really running
things in 1975. This is a well established empirical fact.
Similarly, nothing could be more obvious than that (25) is
false. Even philosophers who get confused over objects
being called by different names at different times and in
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different counterfactual situations ~~ould have no complaint
here. Gorbachev, in fact, had the same name in 1975. To
show that (25) is not false, one would have to show that the
person who is at present Gorbachev was not Gorbachev in 1975.
But it would be a ridiculous waste of time to attempt to do
so.
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Referential Semantics," Diss. M.l.Tn, 1982, pp. 33-40.
55 Ibid ., p. 40.
56 f · 1·· h t· 1o course, ~n c a~m~ng t at a par 1CU ar name or
description has denoted and will always denote the same object,
I do not mean to assert that '-lIe could rlot, at some poirlt in
the future (or did not in the past) use that expression, say
lithe square root of 25," to refer to a differerlt object.
However, if we did this, we would be changing our usage
(i.e., the meaning) of that expression. This is the very
same assumption that Kripke makes wherl he claims that lithe
square root of 25" arld .. Socrates" are rigid designators even
though there are lots of possible worlds in which we use
these expressiollS (wi th a difference ill meaning) to refer to
objects other than their referents in the actual world.
57AlsO , while I won't go through this again, it will
be possible to construct examples analogous to my earlier
examples with "the father of W.A. Mozart" and lithe daughter
of John F. Kennedy" that show that, in some cases, one of the
tests, but not the other, will be useful in proving non-synonomy.
PART TWO:
Fundamental Questions about Reference
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What is the nature of the referential connection
between words and objects?
How do proper names hook up with the world?
What is the nature of the glue that holds words
and their referents together?
How do we manage to refer to things by using
proper names?
How do we manage to refer to anything at all?
These questions are familiar to any student of the philos-
ophy of language. Indeed many philosophers have regarded
them as the fundamental questions to which any theory of
reference must respond. In_this paper, I will argue that,
even though these questions are constantly asked, no clear
sense has been given to them. Also, while it is relatively
easy to suggest different ways in which they could be under-
stood, it is extremely difficult to interpret these questions
in ways that allow us to view the various well-known theories
of reference as providing plausible but conflicting responses
to them.
By way of introduction, consider the following passages.
The first is from Kripke's work, Naming and Necessity. The
next two are from Searle's "Proper Names."
Let me give an example of some of the arguments
which seem conclusive in favor of the view of Frege
and Russell. The basic problem for any view such
as Mill's is how we can determine what the referent
of a name, as used by a given" speaker, is. According
to the description view, the answer is clear. If
'. Jo"e Doakes l is just short for I t11e man who corrupted
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Hadleyburg uniquely', then whoever corrupted
Hadleyburg uniquely is the referent,a! the name
'Joe Doakes '. How~ver, if there is not such a
descriptive content to the name, then-how do
people ever use names to refer to things at all?
Well, they may be in a position to point to some
things and thus determine the references of certain
names ostensively. This was Russell's doctrine of
acquaintance, which he thought the so-called
genuine or proper names satisfied. But of course
ordinary names refer to all sorts of people, like
Walter Scott, to whom we can't possibly point. And
our reference here seems to be determined by our
knowledge of them. Whatever we know about them
determines the referent of the name as the unique
thing satisfying those properties. For example, if
I use the name I l\Japoleon ' , and someone asks I liTo
whom are you referring? I will answer something
like, 'Napoleon was the emperor of the French in
the early part of the nineteenth ~entury; he was
eventually defeated at Waterloo', thus giving
a uniquely identifying description to determine
the referent of the name. Frege and Russell, then,
appear to give the natural account of how refe1ence
is determined here; Mill appears to give none ..
So now it seems as if the rules for a proper
name must somehow be logically tied to particular
characteristics of the object in such a way that
the name has a sense as well as a reference; indeed,
it seems it could not have a reference unless it did
have a sense, for how, unless the name has a sense,
is it to be correlated with the object?2
But as a proper name does not in general specify any
characteristics of the object referred to, how then
does it bring the reference off? How is a connection
between name and object ever set up? This, which
seems the crucial question, ... 3
Not only do these passages explicitly ask several of
the questions I want to examine, they also capture the spirit
of much of the referential debate exceedingly well. In
tllem, two competing theories of reference, Mill's and the
"description" theory, are evaluated on the basis of how they
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respond to questions like "How is the reference of a proper
name determined?" or "How does a proper name come to be
correlated with its referent?" Mor~over, all of the passages
suggest that the Millian view, i.e., that p:r'oper names have a
sense, can not be correct because it leaves us with no answer
to these questions. with this background material in mind,
let's examine some of the ways in which these questions can be
interpreted.
IPerhaps the best way to try to understand these questions
is to consider the views of Frege. After all, the pllrase
"sense determines reference" is best known as a shorthand
statement of one of his most important doctrines. Frege
originally developed the notion of IIsense" irl order to solve
a philosophical puzzle. He claim.ed that we had to maintain
that proper names have both a reference and a sense in order
to explain how identity state~ents could be both true and
:informative. For example, "Cicero = Cicero" and "Cicero =
Tully" are both true, and are about t.he same man. Yet, one
i~ trivial and uninteresting while the other is or could be
quite informative. According to Frege, we can only explain
why this is so if we suppose that "Cicero" and IITully" have
different senses. 4
However, to claim that proper names have both a sense
and a reference would seem to be to claim something weaker
than that the reference of a proper name is determined by
its sense. What does Frege have in mind when he goes 011
to make this stronger claim? Here's one possibility.S For
the sake of precision, we may view the relation between
sense and reference as a set or ordered pairs whose first
members are the senses of particular proper names and whose
second members are the referents of those names. Frege's
assertion that sense determines reference can be taken to
mean that this relation is also a function. That is, no two
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ordered pairs in the relation have the same sense as their
first member.
However, on this understanding of "determine,1I while
it may be true that sense determines reference, sense won't
be the only thing that determines the reference of a proper
name. The problem is that there are infinitely many functions
which map ever so many kinds of things into the set of
referents of proper names. For example, to obtain one such
function, simply pair up each of the referents with a natural
number,· taking care not to pair up one numeber with two
referents. To obtain a different function, just pair up
the referents with different numbers. Obviously we can in
this way generate an infinite number of these types of functions.
Furthermore, we could in this way pair up different kinds of
things with the referents of proper names. We could pair up
the referent of "Nixon" with an atom of hydrogen, the referent
of "Carter" with a different atom of hydI:ogen, and so on.
In fact, we donit even have to pair up things of one kind with
the referents. We could, for example, pair up the referent
of "Reagan" with the number 5, the referent of IICarter ll with
an atom of hydrogen, and the referent of "Nixon ll with a chair.
In addition, interpreting "determines" in this: way does
not help us to see why Frege felt compelled to assert that
sense determines reference. Frege thought that sentences
like n a = b" could be both true and informative only if
1.-
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"a" and lib" both have a sense as well as a referen.ce, and
have different senses. However, consider two proper names,
"e " and lid," which are not coreferential. In this case, Frege
is not forced to assert that "c" and lid" have different senses
in order to explain why lie = dll is both true and informative
because tic = d" is not true. Thus Frege would have been free
to assert that lie" and lid" have the same sense. But to assert
this is to assert that sense does not determine (in the above
set-theoretic sense of "determine") reference, since the set
of ordered pairs whose first members are the senses of proper
names and whose second members are the referents of those
names (i.e., the relation between sense and reference) would
have two ordered pairs with the same first member (the sense
of both "e" and lid"). Thus, since the identity puzzle doesnlt
force Frege to assert that sense determines reference, it is
not clear why he did make this stronger claim.
Hence, under this purely set-theoretic interpretation
of "determine," it is not plausible to think that Frege asserted
that sense determines reference in order to respond to the
question IIWhat determines the reference of a proper name? II And,
as we have seen, this interpretation leaves it somewhat mys-
terious why Frege went so far as to assert that the sense of
a proper name determines its referent. Consequently, we must
search for other interpretations of "determine. 1I
I
II
Another interpretation of our question is suggested by
some of Kripke's remarks in Naming and Necessity. In that
work, Kripke frequently asks not how the reference of a
proper name is determined, but how it is "fixed.,,6 In fact,
he seems to use the terms "fix" and IIdetermine" interchange--
bl h · 1 7a y, t at 1s,synonymous y. Thus let's examine what Kripke
means by expressions like "reference fixing."
The expressions in our language have meaning; moreover,
we are constantly ~ntroducing new expressions. Often we
must explain the meaning of an expression to someone.
Wittgenstein says that these explanations can be divided up,
roughly, into two kinds: verbal definitions and ostensive
defini tions. A verbal def inition, for exaInple, of the word
"bachelor" may be given as follows. I say to some person
"A bachelor is an unITlarried male adult. 1I In contrast, one
may give an ostensive definition of, for instance, the word
"red ll by pointing to different red things and saying IIThis
is red and this is red and this is red." In this case, my
gestures enable the person to understand the term being
defined. Also, sometimes when we give verbal or ostensive
definitions we are not trying to explain what some expression
means. Rather we are introducing a new expression and stip-
ulating what that expression is to mean. For example, I might
introduce the terms "grue" as follows: Something is grue
if and only if it has been observed and is green or it has not
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been observed and is blue. This expression has no meaning
prior to my giving this verbal definition (or, more accurately,
prior to Goodrnanls giving the definition) .
Kripke makes an important point about these definitions.
When we offer a verbal definition to explain or stipulate the
meaning of a term, we don't always intend for the two expres-
sions or phrases involved to have the same meaning. Kripke
discusses at length the definition "A meter is the length of
stick S" (for the sake of simplicity, I have made no reference
to time and temperature in the definition).8 He claims that
even though we use the phrase "the length of stick SIG in
giving the definition, it is not synonymous with the term
"meter." Although I won't go into detail here, the broad
outlines of Kripke's argument for this claim are well-knowno
"Meter" is a rigid designator, whereas, "the length of stick
5 11 is not. 9
However, if "meter" and "the length of stick SIt do not
have the same meaning, in what sense is the statement that a
meter is the length of stick S a definition at all? In
response, Kripke draws a distinction between definitions
which give the meaning of an expression and definitions which
merely f'ix' "t"he" reference of an expression. Al though when
we say that a meter is the length of stick S we don't intend
the two expressions to be regarded as synonymous, we do
indicate "to what the expression "meter" is to referQ And by
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showing to what the term refers we enable people to use it
correctly. Similarly, when we introduce new expressions we
sometimes give definitions which serve-only to fix the
reference of the expressio~. For example, by sti~ulating
that uGlunk" refers to the largest football player on the
Pittsburgh Steeler team, we have not supplied an expression
which is to be regarded as synonymous wi th "Glunk. II ~Iowever,
we have stipulated what IIGlunk" is to refer to and can now
proceed to use that term as a name of the player who sati~fies
the description. 10
Unfortunately, this notion of "reference fixing" can not
supply us with a plausible interpretation of the question
!'How is the reference of a proper name determined?1I First
if we take "determined" to mean "fixed," this question appears
to ask what sort of definition was originally used to introduce
the name into the language. Indeed, Kripke seems to under-
stand the question in this way. In footnote 33 to Naming
and Necessity, he says,
An even better case of determining the reference
of a name by description, as opposed to ostension, is
the discovery of the planet Neptune. Neptune was
hypothesized as the planet which caused such and
such discrepancies in the orbits of certain other
planets. If Leverrier indeed gave the name "Neptune"
to the planet before it was ever seen, then he fixed
the reference of "Neptune" by means of the description
just mentioned.
This passage clearly suggests that the question "How was the
reference of the proper name "Neptune" determined (fixed)?"
I
.
Ii
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is adequately answered by indicating what kind of definition,
verbal or ostensive, was used to introduce the name "Neptune."
However I this question, when asked about any particular
proper name, issimply an empirical question concerning the
manner in which that name was introduced into the language.
To answer it, all we have to do is find out whether a verbal
or ostensive definition was used to introduce the name.
Although this might be difficult to do in practice, in
principle it is a relatively simple matter. Thus it is hard
to see why philosophers would bother to propose elaborate
theories of ~eference', such as ·the causal and description
theories, to answer it.
In fact, if it is held that all we have to do to answer
the question "How is the reference of a proper name determined
or fixed?" is to find out what sort of definition was used to
introduce it, Kripke's own causal theory of reference would
seem to be largely superfluous. That theory states that a
name is introduced at an initial "baptism" ceremony and is then
passed from "link to link" along a "causal chain" to present
speakers. The referent of any proper name which we use today
is the object which was IIbaptized" at the beginning of the
"causal chain." However, if a theory of reference is only
required to describe how the original baptism occured, i.e.,
through an ostensive or verbal (descriptive) definition, there
would seem to be no point in going on to say anything about
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causal chains or descriptions which might currently be
associated with the name.
Moreover, if Kripke's question IIHow is the reference
of a proper name determined (fixed)?" is only meant to ask
how the name was originally introduced, why does Kripke use
the present tense of the verb "to be"? Since most of the
names we use have been in the language for some time, it
would be more appropriate to ask how the reference of a par-
ticular proper name ~ determined. For example, if we want
to know how the name "Aristotle" was originally introduced
it would surely be rather strange to ask "How is the
reference of 'Aristotle' determined?" 11
For the above reasons, it is clear that Kripke's
use of the notion of reference "fixing"has not furnished us
with an adequate interpretatj.on of the question "H.ow is the
reference of a proper name determined?" It simply is not
plausible to suppose that so many philosophers would find
it necessary to;Mork out such elaborate theories of reference
in order to respond to such a theoretically uninteresting,
empirical, and apparently ill-stated question. Consequently,
we are forced to look elsewhere for a reasonable interpre-
tation of our question. Pcrllaps a good way to proceed is
to consider how the expression lito determine" is used in other
non-philosophical contexts.
III
Consider sentences (1) - (~).
1. How will he determine· who broke the window?
2. If we don't stay and watch, how will we
determine who won the Super Bowl while we
are on the road?
3. How did you determine that he was the
murderer?
4. Do you think that we could determine who
Jack the Ripper really was after all of
this time?
5. Is it possible to determine whether or
not God exists?
These questions could be restated as follows:
6. How will he discover (or find out) who broke
the window?
7. If we don't stay and watch, how will we find
out who won the Super Bowl while we are one
the road?
8. How did you discover that he was the
murderer?
9. Do you think that we could find out who
Jack the Ripper really was after all of this
time?
10. Is it possible to discover whether or not
God exists:
Sentences (6) - (10) clearly ask the same questions as
sentences (1) - (5). Thus, in ordinary usage, "to determine"
often means simply .Ito find out" or lito come to know."
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In fact, there is, at least initially, some reason to
think that this epistemic sense of lito determine" is
intended by the question "How is the reference of a proper
name determined?" Consider the following remarks from
Naming and Necessity::
The basic problem for any view such as Mill's
is how we can determine what the referent of a
name, as used by a given speaker, is. 12
The picture associated with the description
theory is that only by giving some unique
properties can you know who someone is and 13
thus know what the reference of your name is.
Both of these passages suggest that Kripke thinks that
the question which any ~heory of reference must address
is how we can learn what the referent of a proper name is.
Unfortunately, while the question is relatively
clear when understood in this way, this interpretation
must, for several reasons, be rejected. First, on this
reading, there doesn't seem to be any philosophical reason
for asking this question. To see this, suppose that someone
were to say to me IIReagan is 74 years old." I, like most
people, would not have any reason to as]c how I could find
out what the referent of the proper name "Reagan ll is.
already know who Reagan is. In contrast, if someone ut-
tered a sentence to me that contained a proper name which
I had never heard of, I might well have to ask someone
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how I could find out what that name referred to so that I
could understand the earlier statement. In general,
people ordinarily ask how they can find out what the refer-
ent of a proper name is only in order to understand some
statement which made use of that name.l4 But clearly
philosophers have no such practical reasons for asking how
one can determine what the referent of a proper name is.
Also, and more importantly, even if there were
some philosophical motivation for asking this question,
neither the causal nor the description theory of refer-
ence can be viewed as even initially plausible answers.
The question seems to ask for a description or list of
the methods we actually employ to find out what the
referents of particular proper names are. However, the
causal and description:theories don't seem to be concerned
with providing any sort of description or list. The
causal theory states only that the referent of a proper
name is the person or object which lies at the beginning,
or "baptism" point, of a "causal chain" of utterances
of that name. The description theory says only that
the referent of a name is the object which satisfies the
description (or "cluster ll of descriptions) with which
the name is synonymous.
Still, while neither theory makes any explicit
•
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statement about how one might actually go about finding
out what the referent of a particular proper name is, we
might try to view these theories as making some general
suggestions in this regard. The description theory, for
instance, might be taken as suggesting that in order to
find out what the referent of some proper name is we must
find out what descriptions are synonymous with that name
and what object satisfies those descriptions. Similarly,
the causal theory might seem to suggest (and this is
especially general and vague) that we trace the causal
chain associated with a proper name in order to find out
what object was baptized at the beginning of the chain.
Initially these suggestions might seem, in a very
general way, to be in accord with the methods we actually
use to find out to what a proper name refers. To see
thi~, consider how a person, Fred, who doesn't know to
what the proper name "Ronald Reagan" refers, mig11t go
about finding out. Fred might ask the person who first
uttered the name to him either to point out Reagan
or to tell him where he could find someone who could point
out Reagan. This kind of attempt seems to correspond
to the causal theory in that Fred seems, to some degree,
to be tracing the "causal chain" associated with"Ronald
Reagan. II At least he is not asking anyone to describe
Reagan in any way. Alternatively, Fred might consult
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other sources of information such as newspapers, dictionaries,
or encyclopedias.. If he does this, he will probably
find out rather quickly that the name IIRonald Reaga.n" is
associated with various descriptions. In particular, Fred
will find out "Ronald Reagan" refers to the person who
satisfies the definite description "the President of the
United States." In this way, Fred could learn to what
the name Ronald Reagan refers without bothering to have
someone point-Reagan out to him. Thus this kind of
attempt would seem to be suggested, not by the causal theory,
but by the description theory.
However, even if the two theories seem relevant and
helpful in this very general way, it is still clear that
their proponents gid not propose them in order to answer
the question "How can we find out what the referent of a
proper name is?U The philosophers who have proposed the
causal and description theories consider them to be com-
plete in themselves and incompatible with each other. That
is, each theory is intended to give a full account of how
the reference of a proper name is determined; and it is
not considered possible that both of the theories are
true~ However, when interpreted in the very general way
above, both theories do, in fact, seem to accurately de-
scribe at least some of the ways in which we find out
to what proper names refer. Moreover, each of the theories
is obviously incomplete in that it fails to suggest the
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methods which the other theory suggests. It may well be
true that we can find out to what a proper name refers by
getting someone to point out, without describing, the
referent of the proper name. But we ~ay equally well be
able to find out to what o. name refers, n(";(;. by having
someone point out the referent;, bl:t ~ .. j tindi.ng some des-
criptions corr~only associated with the name.
IV
Since investigating different senses of the expression
"determine ll has not enabled us to find a satisfactory inter-
pretation of the question "How is the reference of a proper
name determined?," perhaps it would be helpful to examine
some other questions which are often raised in the same con-
texts. How do we manage to use proper names to refer to
anything at all? Or, how is it possible to use a proper name
to refer to s\~mething? Both of these questions are raised,
in slightly different wording, by Kripke and Searle in the
passages quoted at the beginning of this paper. But what
is the problem? Isn't that just what we use proper names
for, to refer to things? Let's see if we can give a clear
sense to these questions.
In philosophy, questions containing the expressions "how
is it possible to" and IIhow do we manage to" are often under-
stood in a special way. Consider the following familiar
questions.
11. How is motion possible?
12. How are true negative existential statements
possible?
13. How do we manage to make identity statement~
which are both true and informative?
These questions are all asked for the same reason. In each
case, there is a philosophical argument that the task involved
is not possible. For example, the argument corresponding to
question (11) goes as follows:
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f14) In order to travel any distance, one must
first travel half of that distance, and
then half of tIle remaining distance, and
then half of the remaining distance, and
so on, ad infinit~m.
•
•
••
(15) In order to travel any distance, one must
complete an infinite number of tasks (sub-
journeys) .
(16) One can't complete an infinite number of
tasks in a finite amount of time .
•
• •
( 17) One can't travel any distance.
motion is impossible.
That is,
Of course, this is just one rather rough formulation of
Zeno's paradox. Other formulations are equally familiar~
Similarly, the arguments associated with questions (12) and
(13) are among the most famous in the philosophy of language.
Do questions like "How do we manage to lIse proper names
to refer to things?" get their sense in this manner? Do
the philosophers who ask them desire a response to some
argument purporting to prove that it is impossible to use a
proper name to refer to something? Interestingly, in recent
years, an argument, or family of arguments, has been put
forward which purports to show that it is indeed impossible
to use any expression to mean something or to refer to some-
thing. These arguments can be found in Kripke's recent
work on Wi ttgenstein, Quine's views on the "irldeterminacy in
translation" and the "inscrutability of reference ... II and
Putnam's recent work on "metaphysical realism~' and the cor-
respondence theory of truth. These arguments are very complex
and difficult. Since Il m interested 1n their" general structure,
not th~dr specific contents, and Kripke' s discus'sion is
the clearest of the three, I will concentrate on his state-
ment of the argument.
In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language 6 Kripke
presents what he considers to be the central argument of
Wittgensteinls Philosophical Investigations, in the form of
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a "skeptical paradox." He asks us to imagine the following
situation. For every person, there is some number such that
it is larger than any number which he has previously added
to another number. For the sake of simplicity, let's suppose
that for some particular person, Jones, that number is 57.
A].so, suppose that some "skeptic" asks Jones what the sum
of 57 and 68 is. Jones, after doing the calculation for the
first time, responds that 57 plus 68 is 125. At this point
the skeptic makes a rather incredible claimw He says that
while Jones'answer is correct, Jones has actually changed his
usage of the terms "plus," "sum,1I and lIaddition." In the
past, says the skeptic, Jones used the addition sign, "+,"
to denote a different function, the uquaddition" function.
That function is defined as follows.
=
(18) (x)( y) (x qUl:\S Y = x plus Y if X, Y < 57
5 otllerwise )
The skeptic maintai.ns that if Jones was using the words
"plus," "sum," and "addition" (etc.) in the same way as he
did in the past, he should have answered liS," and not "125."
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Jones, of course, is incredulous and objects vehemently that
he is absoiutely certain that he used to mean addition by
"plus" and not quaddition. In response, the skeptic admits
that Jones feels certain about this, but points out that
Jones had a bad LSD trip last night and that might account
for his sincere but mistaken belief that he has not changed
his usage of the terms "plus," "sum," and "addition." The
skeptic challenges Jones to give some hard proof that, in
the past, he meant "plus" rather than "gullS. 1I
Kripke then goes through a number of ways in which Jones
might try to prove that in the past he really was computing
the addition function rather than the quaddition function.
The skeptic, in turn, shows that all of the evidence which
Jones cites is inadequate. The skeptic rejectE the sug-
gestion that something present in Jones' mind or brain, such
as mental pictures or images of mathematical rules, shows
Jones meant "plus," rather than "gullS." Also, nothing about
Jones' past behavior or even his past dispositions to behave
in particular ways establishes that he meant IIplus.1I Nor
would claiming that the hypothesis that Jones meant IIplus "
is more simple than the hypothesis that he meant II quUS " show
that Jones meant IIplus ."
In short, the skeptic claims that there is no reason to
say that Jones used to mean "plus" rather than "quUS."
Moreover~ if it is impossible to justify the claim that Jones,
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in the past, meant "plus" rather than u quus," it would also
seem impossible to justify the claim that Jones (or anyone
else) is presently computiIlg the addi tion function, and not
some other function. Just as we are presently able to con-
struct a skeptical hypothesis that Jones, in the past, was
really computing the quaddition function, we could in the
future construct a similar hypothesis that Jones is not
really, at present, computing the addition function. And,
just as we can not refute the skeptic concerning Jones'
past usage of terms like "plus," "sum," and "addi tion, n \o\'e
can not refute the futu.re skeptic' s (~laim concerning Jones I
present usage of those terms.
This then is the "skeptical paradox." It is an argument
purporting to establish that there is no reason to think that
we are now computing the addition function, when we give the
sums of various pairs of numbers, rather than some other
function. It is, to say the least, a highly unusual argument.
Readers unfamiliar with Kripke's presentation of this argument
will undoubtedly have many questions. However, Kripke's actual
discussion of the paradox is much too long and complex to
include here in any detail. Fortunately, complete mastery
of this difficult argument is not essential for understanding
the general points which I will make about it.
'~I Before I comment on the argument, however, I want to show,
briefly, how some of the views of Quine and Putnam are related
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to this skeptical paradox. Quine raises some of the same
worries in his now famous work on the "indeterminacy of
translation" and the "inscrutability of reference." In
Word and Object, he asks how someone, without translation
manuals or similar help, might translate the expression
"gavagai" as used by the natives of a different cUlture.16
Quine argues that there is no "fact of the matter" as to
whether the expression should be translated as "rabbit ll
or as "undetached rabbit parts. 1I He claims that there is
nothing in the natives' behavior or in their behavioral dis-
positions which WQ\11d justify translating Ugavagai II one vlay
rather than the other. As Kripke points out, this is slightly
different from the skeptic's approach in that the skeptic
is willing to consider any type of evidence, including, as
Quine would not, mental images and other "inner states" that
someone might .cite. However, while Quine places some
restrictions on the kinds of evidence he will consider, his
argument strongly resembles the skeptical paradox in that
both argue that we are not justified in making a particular
claim about meaning. Kripke's skeptic argues that there is
no evidence that shows that Jones meant "plus" rather than
IIquUS ." Quine argues that there is no evidence that estab-
lishes that Ugavagai" means "rabbit" rather than "undetached
rabbit parts. II
Putnam, in his recent work, also expresses concern that
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various interpretations, of the expressions of our language
-bl 17 - k d -are POSS1 e. In contrast to Kr1p e an QU1ne, Putnam
does not concentrate on any particular term. Rather, he
argues that our language, viewed as a whole, has many
"admissible" interpretations or models. He even gives a
"proof" that there is an "admissible u interpretation of our
language in which the word "cat" refers not to eat.s, but to
cherries~18 These bizarre interpretations are "admissible ll
in the sense that they meet certain "operational and theoretical"
constraints. Putnam argues that it is impossible to justify
any additional constraints that would single out one of
these "admissible" interpretations as the "intended" inter-
pretation. That is, there is no reason to say that one of
the "admissible" interpretations is in fact the real or true
interpretation of our language.19 Again, this claim is
analogous to the claim that Kripke's skeptic makes when he
argues that there is no way to rule out either of the two
possible interpretations (liplus " and "quuS") of Jones' past
usage of the terms "plus," "sum," and "addition.:"
From these brief descriptions of the arguments of Kripke,
Quine, and Putnam, it is possible to see the general form of
the argument that meaning something (and, hence, referring to
something) is impossible. It goes as follows:
(19) There is no reason to say that, in using
any expression, we mean one thing rather
than something else. 20
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(20) If there is no good reason to say we mean one
thing rather than another by our expressions,
then it is false to say that we mean one thing
rather than another. (It would be false to say
that we mean "plus" alld are, at present, com-
puting the addition function) .
.:. (21) In using expressions, we don't mean one thing
rather than another. That is, meaning some~
thing is impossible.
Interestingly, this argument can be used to give a clear
sense not only to the question "How do we manage to use
proper names to refer to things?," but also to the question
"How is the reference of a proper name determined? II When
Kripke, Quine, and Putnam discuss their concerns about the
notions of meaning and reference, they often make use of the
expression lito determine" and its near relatives. For
example, instead of asking how it is possible for an ex-
pression to mean one thing rather than another, they often
ask what "determines" whether an expression (say "gavagai")
lneans one thing ("rabbit ll ) rather than another (liundetached
rabbit parts"). Putnam even uses the term "to fix" in these
contexts. Instead of asking how it is possible to single
out one of the "admissible" interpretations of our language
as the lIintended ll model, he will occasionally ask what "fixes"
one particular interpretation of our language as the "intended"
or "correct" model.
Since philosophers who offer the various theories of
reference in response to questions like "How is the reference
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of a proper name determined?1I and IIHow do we manage to use
proper names to refer to anything?" obviously don't think
that meaning and reference are impossible, it seems we
must regard the causal and description theories as attempts
21to show what is wrong with the "skeptical" argument. ~
Moreover, since the argument is pretty clearly valid, they
must be regarded as attempts to refute one of the premises.
The second premis~ (20), seems to be a formulation of the
principle of sufficient reason. This kind of inference (or,
in this case, premise) occurs occasionally in philosophical
arguments. Whatever' one feels about its legitimacy, it is
obvious that the description and causal theories of reference
are Ilot intended to show that inferences relying on this
principle are unjustified. Thus, if these theories are to
be regarded as responding "to the IIskeptical ll argur:tent, we
must take them to be directed against the first premise of
the argument. They must be viewed as offering a way for us
to rule out the various skeptical hypotheses by giving us some
evidence establishing that one interpretation of an expression,
rather than some other "skeptical" interpretation, is correct
or lIintended."
However, the description theory and the causal theory do
not offer plausible reasons for rejecting "unintended" skep-
tical hypotheses. To see this, suppose that the skeptic
proposes the following hypothesis about the proper name
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"Aristotle. 1I He says that just as Jones is mistaken in
believing that he used to use "plus" to mean addition rather
than quaddition, we are mistaken in claiming that we use the
proper name "Aristotle ll to refer to Aristotle rather than
Caesar. We might, using the description theory, respond that
the name "Aristotle ll is synonymous with lithe teacher of
Alexander" and that description ~enotes Aristotle, not Caesar.
However, anyone who has played the skeptic's game for a while
could see how he would respond. The skeptic would deny that
"the teacher of Alexar!der n denotes Aristotle. He would come
up with a new hypothesis that the description really refers
to Caesar, not Aristotle. Alternatively, he might even
claim that the description denotes neither Aristotle nor
Caesar, and offer this as evidence that the name and the
description are not really synonymous. The problem is that
the skeptic's skepticism is general. On his view, it is
impossible for a proper name, a definite description, or any
expression to have meaning or reference. Thus saying that one
expressi.on means the same thing as another expression does not
say why either of them should be regarded as meaning or referring
to one thing rather than something else. This response is so
obvious that it is implausible to suppose that a philosopher
would offer the description theory in response to the ske~tic's
argument.
Likewise, the causal theory does not offer a plausible
way of singling out one interpretation of an expression or of
164
our language as a whole as the llIintended li interpretation.
We have this "from the horses' mouths U so to speak. Both
Kripke and Putnam make it clear that their causal theories
are not intended as responses to the skeptic. In "Realism
and Reason," Putnam says
Notice that a 'causal' theory of reference is
not (would not be) of any help here: for how
~causesl can uniquely refer is as much of a
puzzle as how 'cat· can on t11e metaphysical
realist picture.
The problem, in a way, is traceable back
to Occam. Occam introduced the idea that
concepts are (mental) particulars. If
concepts are particulars (fsigns r ), then any
concept we may have of the relation between
a sign and its object is another sign. But
it is unintelligible, from mv point of view,
how the sort of relation the metaphysical
realist envisages as holding between a sign and
its object can be singled out either by holding
up the sign itself, thus
G
or by holding up yet another sign, thus
Irefers I
or perhaps
[cause~
If concepts are not particulars, on the other
hand, the obvious possibility is that {in so far as
they are Tin the headf} they are ways o~ using
signs. But a 'user theory, while intelligible
(and, I believe, correct) as an account of what
understandinq the signs 'consists in, doe,s not single out
a un1que re~ation between the terms of Tl and the
; real. OD]ects Ii. If we don't think concepts
are ext"nett particulars (.signs) or ways of us~ng
signs, then, I think we are going to be led back
to direct (and mysterious) grasps of Forrns. 22
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Putnam seems to be making a similar point in the following
Suppose there is a possible naturalis-tic
or physicalistic definition of reference, as
Field contends. Suppose
<'1) X refers to y if and only if x bears
R to y is true • • .
the reference of IX bears R to y' is itself
indeterminate, and so knowing that (1Y-1S
true will not help. Each admissible model
of our object language will correspond to a
model of our meta-language in which (1) holds:;
the interpretatioa of IX bears R to yl will
fix the interpretation of IX refers to y'.
But this will only be a relation in each
admissib'le model; it will not serve to cut
down the number of admissible models at all.23
While both of these passages are difficult and unclear in
several respects, it is clear that Putnam is claiming that
causal theories of reference don't give us a way to rule out
any of the bizarre but "admissible" interpretations as being
"unintended. II
Similarly, it seems equally obvious that Kripke doesn't
think the causal theory which he put forward in Naming and
Necessity would be of any use in rebutting the skeptic's
challenge cOllcerning "plus" and "quus." Af'ter all, al though
Kripke considers all sorts of responses which he finds plausible,
he doesn't even mention his causal theory of reference in this
context. Surely, if Kri~ke first offered the causal theory
in order to respond to skeptical problems about how meaning
and reference are possible, he would at least mention the
theory.
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So, while the skeptical paradox about meaning
reference may well ee, as Kripke says, one of the mo~
found of philosophical paradoxes, and may also be a good
statement of what has been bothering ~any philosophers
about meaning and reference, it doesn't solve the problem
of this paper. We have been searching for an understanding
of questions like "How is the reference of a proper name
determined?" and "How do we manage to use a proper name to
refer to something?" which allo\vs us to regard the causal
and description theories of reference as plausible responses.
However, as we have just seen, these theories aren't
intended to solve the problems presented by the skeptical
paradox. Thus while the paradox enables us to give a clear
sense to the questions with w~lich we are concerned, we still
don't understand what problem the causal and description
theories of reference are supposed to address.
vOur ordinary usage of questions containing phrases like
llliow is it possible to" and "how does one manage to It sllggests
several other ways in which we could understand the question
"How do we manage to use proper names to refer to things?"
I want now to examine a couple of these interpretations.
First, consider questions (22) - (25).
(22) How did the baby manage to get out of
the cri.b?
(23) How did Einstein manage to think of the
theory of relativity?
(24) How did the Mets manage to win the 1969
World Series?
(25) How was it possible for Mark Spitz to
win seven gold medals in the Olympics?
Unlike the questions C<'11) - (13)) which we considered in
Section IV, questions (22) ~- (25) and other similar everyday
questions often have sense because there is some reason to think
that the actions and feats performed are, not impossible, but
difficult. No one ever won seven gold medals in an olympics
before, and the Mets were one of the worst teams in the
league the year before they won the World Seri~s. To ade-
quately respond to these questions one must explain how the
difficulties in performing the feats involved were overcome.
Unfortunately, although questions containing phrases
like "now is it possible to" and "how do we manage to" often
get their sense in this way, we still are not in a position to
understand the question "How do we manage to use proper names
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to refer to things? II Suppose that someone were to ask how
a particular person, Bob, manages to stand up. If Bob is
a perfectly healthy adult, it's hard to see how we are to
respond. But if we are told that both of Bob's legs are
brok~n or that he has just drunk two full bottles of whiskey,
the question makes sense. Similarly, it would make sense to
ask how a person could manage to use an automobile to refer
to something since words and certain gestures are usually
used for this purpose. But since philosophers who ask how
we manage to use proper names to refer to things haven't
given any clear reasons for thinking it would be difficult
to use proper names to refer, it isn't clear how we are to
respond.
However, I think it is possible to interpret "how is
it possible to" questions in another way which does not depend
on our being able to give some reason for thinking that the
task involved would be difficult to perform~ Again, consider
the question "How did Bob manage to stand Up?1I This time, how-
ever, imagine the following context: Professor Smith is teaching
a course in anatomy and voluntary motor function at the local
medical school. The entire course has been spent investigating
the ways in which our bodies operate when we perform various
eve1yday activities such as running and walking. One day, the
prof~ssor asks one of his students, Bob, to stand up. After
Bob has done this, Smith asks the entire class "How was it
possible for Bob to stalled up? II Even though no one has al1Y
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reason to think that Bob would have any difficulty in standing
up, the professor's question is clear to all of ·the students.
Smith is asking for a description of the causal relationships
between the parts of the body involved in the act of standing
up. He wants to know about the causally related sequence of
events that took place in Bob's body from the time at which he
decided to stand up to the time when he was on his feet.
Thus when philosophers ask how we manage to use proper
names to refer to things, perhaps they are asking for a
physical description of some causal mechanism involved in re-
ferring to something by uttering a proper name. In fact, this
notion of a causal mechanism or sequence ~ould also be
used to give sense to the question "How is the reference of
a proper name determined?" We often talk of one event causally
determining another. For example, suppose thaL we have a
machine rather like the ones that give change for dollar bills.
This machine, however, is rather irregular. Sometimes it
gives out four quarters in exchange for a dollar, and some-
tim~s it gives out two quarters and five dimes. In this con-
text, it makes perfect sense to ask what determines the Qut-
put of the machine. What is desired is a description of the
causally relate~ sequence of events which take place inside
the machine and which result in the machine giving out either
four quarters or two quarters and five dimes. In other words,
we want to know how the machine works.
..
Il!
I
r
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Moreover, I have had many conversations about how the
reference of a proper name is determined in which people
have given me the impression that they are indeed conceiving
of reference in this mechanistic way. These people seem
struck by the fact that when we utter some proper name in a
sentence, we often refer to objects that are a long 'distance
away, both spatially and perhaps even temporally. It's almost
as if, when they think at an instance of using a proper name
to refer to someth.ing, they can picture the sound waves coming
out of someone's mouth, and after travelling a particular path
through some sort of mechanism, "landing" on the referent of
the name. This doesn't seem to be much different from the way
in which some people talk about the problem of, not referring
to someone, but merely thinking about someone. The picture
there is that, when we think about someone, somehow a beam
or ray comes out of our brains and focuses on the person about
whom we are thinking.
However, while it is possible to use these metaphors
to give sense to the questions which live been considering,
this mechanistic interpretation is inadequate in several
respects. First, it isn't completely clear that likening
the relationship between the use of a proper name and
the referent of that name to the mechanistic and causal se-
quence of events that take place in the metaphors which I
have offered is appropriate. In many, if not most, of the
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cas~s in which distinct events are causally related (i.e.,
where C causes something which causes somethirlg else which
causes E), time passes between the occurences of the events.
This is true of both the causal sequeIlce involved i11 Bob IS
act of standing up and the causal sequence involved in the
dollar machine's giving out change when a dollar is put in the
slot. In contrast, the events of my uttering a proper narrte
in some sentence and my referring to a particular object are
not separated in time. No philosopher would claim that my
referring to the referent of a proper name takes place at
some time after my using the name in some sentence.
More importantly, even if we suppose that the two
events are causally related and occur at the sa~e time and
that questions like "How is the reference of a proper name
detennined?" should be viewed as as]~ing for a description
of that relationship, this interpretation does not satisfy
one of the requirements of this paper. I have argued that
an adequate interpretat"ion of the questions I've beell ex-
amining requires that it is possible to view the causal and
description theories of reference as initially plausible, but
conflicting responses. Perhaps it is possible to view the
causal theory, with its talk of a proper name passing from
speaker to speaker along a "causal chai,n, II as a description of
some sort of causal or. physical relationship between the
referent of a name and various utterances of the name itself.
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However, the description theory says only that a proper name
is synonymous wi tho a particular defini te -description or cluster
of descriptions. It obviously does not even attempt to
describe any causal or physical relationship between a
proper name' and its referent. Thus if Kripke is correct when
he says that the description theory gives a natural response to
the question "How is t~!e reference of a proper name dete.rmined? II
(and that Mill gives no response), we haven't yet found the
intended sense of th~ question.
(26) (x)
VI
Some readers might object that I've been looking for
too deep and profound a sense for the questions I've been
examining. Perhaps the proper way to understand tllem has
been under our noses the whole time. Perhaps all that
philosophers who ask these questions desire is a set of
necessary and sufficient conditions for reference. That is,
perhaps all that these philosophers want is to be able to
correctly "fill in the blank u in expressions like (26).
("Aristotle" refers to x if and only if
).24
--------
This interpretation of the question I!ve been con-
sidering has several features that recommend it. First,
it satisfies the two requirements that I mentioned at the
beginning of this paper. That is, it allows us to view
the causal and description theories of reference as initially
plausible, but conflicting answers to these questions. The
fact that so many philosophers have supported the various
versions of these theories would seem to indicate that
they both have, at least initially, some degree of plausi-
bility. And Kripke and others have provided many ingenious
examples that show that the two theories are fundamentally
incompatible.
Also, on this interpretation, it is still possible
to see why someone might be inclined to ask questions like
"How is reference possible?" Perhaps the best illustration
of this is found in Putnam's book Reason, Truth and
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History. He begins that book by telling a story about an
ant which, while crawling about in the sand, accidently
traces out a figure which strongly resembles Winston Churchill. 25
Putnam argues that, in spite of this, the ant's figure clearly
does not "stand for," "represent,1I or urefer to" Winston
Churchill. Moreover, particular words such as "Churchill"
can and do "represent ll or IIrefer toll Churchill even though
they do not resemble him at all. Thus, says Putnam, mere
similarity is neither necessary nor sufficient to make
something stand for, or refer to something else.
At this juncture, Putnam asks,
If similarity is not necessary or sufficient
to make something represent something else,
how can anyth1ng be necessary or sufficient
for this purpose? How on earth can one thing
represent (or "stand for,1I etc.) a different
thing?26
The second of these questions clearly could be restated as
"How (on earth) is reference possible?" or "How do we
manage to refer to things?" "Thus we have here an example
of a philosopher asking one of the questions live been
examining in the context of a search for a set of necessary
and sufficient conditions for reference. Moreover, his
reason for expressing his desire in such a seemingly desperate
tone is clearly that he thinks it will be exceedingly diffi-
cult to provide such a set.
However, although it may well be true that philosophers
have been searching for a set of necessary and sufficient
conditions for reference, this is not all that they desire
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when they ask the questions live been considering. To see
this, consider the following four sentences:
(L) (x) ("Aristotle" refers to x if and only
if "Aristotle" refers to x) G
(T) (x) ("Aristotle ll refers to x if and only
if x is Aristotle) .
(D) (x) ("Aristotle" refers to x if and only
if x is denoted by the definite de-
description lithe teacher of Alexander ll
which is synonymous"with the proper
name "Aristotle").
(el (x) ("Aristotle" refers to x if and only if
x lies at the beginning ("point of
baptism") of the causal chain associated
with our current usage of the proper
name "Aristotle").
Since all four of these sentences offer necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for reference (to Aristotle), they all
offer, in one sense, a "definition" or "theory" of reference.
Moreover, both (L) and (T) are obviously true. Thus, if all
that"philosophers have been after is a set of necessary and
sufficient conditions for reference, there would seem to
be nothing left to do.
But philosophers have not been satisfied with these
"definitions" or "theories." And it is not difficult to
see why many philosophers would find (L) and, to a lesser
degree, (T) of little interest. After all, one wouldn't
even have to know what "refers" means in order to be able
to tell that (T) is true. It is a logical truth. Similarly,
knowing what "refers ll means would seem to be about all that
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one would need to know in order to be able to tell that (T)
is true A It is very hard to imagine a person who both
understands the terms "refers" and also thinks that (T)
is false.
J.
Thus it is clearly not plausible to interpret questions
J.ike "How do we manage to refer to things?" as merely asking
for necessary and sufficient conditions for reference. The
philosophers who ask these questions are after a particular
kind of definition or theory. Bllt what kind of defini tion
should we try to give in response to these questions? Why
are the definitions offered by sentences like (L) and (T)
inadequate? Interestingly, these very questions are the
central concern of several r~cent papers by Hartry Field
and Hilary Putnam. Since these philosophers explicitly
consider these questions, I think it will be helpful
to look at the general character of \.:heir debate.
In his paper "Tarski I s Theory of Truth," Field arglles
that just because we can generate a list of true sentences
like (T) by substituting different proper names for "Aristotle"
we should not think that we have given an adequate definiti.on
of reference. Here is the crucial passage of Field 2 s article.
Now, it would have been easy for a chemist,
late in the last century, to have given a
'valence definition' of the following form:
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(3) (VE) (~) (E has valance n!E is potassium
and n is +1, or ••• or E is sulphur and
n is -2)
where in the blanks go a list of similar clauses,
one for each element. But, though this is an
extensionally correct definition of valence,
it would not have been an acceptable reduction;
and had it turned out that nothing else was
possible -- had all efforts to explain valence
in terms of the structural properties of atoms
proved futile -- scientists would have eventually
had to decide either Ca) to give up valence theory,
or else (b) to replace the hypothesis of physical-
ism by another hypothesis (chemicalisrn?). It
is part of scientific methodology to resist doing
(b); and I also think it is part of scientific
methodology to resist doing (a) as long as the
notion of valence is serving the purposes for
which it was designed (i.e., as long as it is
proving useful in help1ng us characterize
chemical compounds in terms of their valences) .
But the methodology is not to resist (a) and
(b) by giving lists like (3); the methodology
is to look for a real reduction. This is a
methodology that has proved extremely fruitful
in science, and I think weld be crazy to give
it up in linguistics. And I think we are
giving up this fruitful methodology, unless
we realize that we need to add theories of
primitive reference to Tl or T2 if we are to
establish the notion of truth as a physical-
istically acceptable notion. 2J
So Field is arguing that the notions of truth and reference,
if they are to be "scientifically acceptable," rrLust not
be defined by giving a list of sentences like (T). Rather,
we must also seek a "physicalistic" definition. In particular,
Field mentions the need for causal theories of reference
like the theory which is proposed by Kripke and offered
by (C). 28
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In his John Locke lectures of 1976, Putnam (citing
a point made by Stephen Leeds) responds that we do not need
a "physicalistic" def initiell of reference because the
notion of reference is different in important ways from
the concepts, like valence, of natural science. He argues
as follows:
The real point of Leed's reply to Field
is this: valence is an explanatory notion
(i.e., a causal-explanatory notion). Since
we intend the existence of various valences
to figure in chemistry as a cause, we have
to say what valence is, not just give the
numerical values. But Leeds is denying
that reference is a causal-explanatory
notion. We need notions like truth and refer-
ence to express certain things (which could,
in principle, be expressed in other ways
-- by using infinitary languages). For this
purpose, it is immaterial if primitive refer-
ence is defined in what Field calls a "crazy"
way. Reference isn't (or, anyway, Field hasn't
shown that it is) a causal-explanatory notion.
In short, we can give a "transcendental ar-
gument" for Tarski's procedure by appealing
to a purpose for having notions like truth
and reference' which is not at all parallel
to the purpose for which we have notions
like valence. 29
So Putnam, although he admits that it might be possible to
give a correct "physicalistic" definition or analysis of
reference, contends that Field has not established that
30it is necessary to do so.
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Regardless of whether it is, in fact, necessary that
we provide a "physicalistic" definition of reference, this
debate illustrates several important points. For all we
know, it might be possible to give several, perhaps many,
definitions of reference which are both true and, for one
purpose or another, interesting and usefule And a definition
which is adequate for one purpose may not be adequate for
another 0 For example, a Tarski style definition of reference
may be useful for some purposes, but it does not, as Field
points out, serve to define reference in terms of the con-
f h · 31cepts 0 P YS1CS. Similarly, a Kripke style causal theory
of reference may be useful for some purposes but not for
others. 32 Consequently, if a philosopher asks us to provide
a theory or definition of reference, we can respond adequately
only if we have a clear idea why that philosopher is asking
for a definition.
Unfortunately, while all of this may be interesting
and important, it doesn't solve the problem of this paper.
For what purpose have philosophers proposed the causal and
description theories of reference~ To what problem or
question are these theories addressed? The point of this
paper has been that it is inadequate to respond by claiming
that the causal and description theories are intended to
tell 118 how reference is "deteL'!lLLIled" or how reference is
"possible. II And I 1 m certain tha t the reader is by now
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aware that I don't believe that there is one clear problem
to which the various theories of reference are addressed.
In order to drive this home, I would like to conclude
by pointing out what I find to be a particularly striking
example of how unclear philosophers can be about their
reasons for proposing a particular theory of reference.
As we have seen, Putnam, in his Locke lectures, has engaged
in an extensive debate concerning the reasons why we ought
to try to give particular kinds of definitions of reference-
Thus one would expect that he would be especially clear about
his reasons for proposing his own causal theory of reference.
But consider what he says about that theory in the fifth
Locke lecture.
To say this is not to repudiate the 'causal
theory of reference' (I would rather call it
the 'social co-operation plus contribution of
the environment theory of the specification of
reference') that Kripke put forward and that I
developed in 'The Meaning of 'Meaning-I.
Kripke and I were doing two things:
(1) We were attacking the idea that speakers
pick our referents in the following way:
each term T is 'associated' by each speaker
with a property PT (the 'intension' of T).The terms applies to whatever has the property
PT·
(2) We were ~iving an alternative account of how
speakers do pick out referents if they
don't associate terms with necessary and
sufficient conditions (or properties PT )
as required by, say, Russell's theory.
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Both (1) and (2) still seem right to me, and
worth doing. But a theory of how reference is
specified isn't a theory of what reference ~ 33
~n facE, it presupposes the notion of reference.
According to this pas~~ge, the Putnam-Kripke causal
theory of reference. ·~resupposeB" the notion of reference
and is, there~ore, only intended to answer the questions
"How is reference specified?" and "How do speakers pick out
referents? II In contrast, Field's sought after physicalistic
defini~ion of reference would not presuppose the notion of
reference and would answer the question "What is reference?"
However, expressions like lito specify" and "to pick out" are
-just as unclear as the expressions "to determine ll and lito
fix. II Consequently, since he nowhere explains wha t he means
by these terms, Putnam's own attempt to explain why he pro-
posed his causal theory is a complete failure.
VII
In this paper, I have considered many possible inter-
pretations of questions like "How is the reference of a proper
name deterrnined?U and "How do we manage to refer to anyth,ing
at all?" Obviously, not every interpretation which mig11t be
given has been or even could be considered. Thus, while I
think that I have covered their most natural interpretations,
it is still possible that I have simply missed the intended
senses of these questions. However, the main point of this
pc.:~?er has been to indicate how difficultit is to give sense
to these questj_ons in a way that permits us to regard the
causal and description theor!es as plausible, though con-
flicting responses. And, if this paper inspires the reader
to be more careful and clear about his or her reason~ and
goals in prop~sing a theor7 of reference, it has fulfilled
its purpose.
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"meter might not have been meter") is rlot even grammatical.
Perhaps Kripke could have avoided this problem by using
either "one meter" or lithe length which is one meter" i,nstead.
lOI've been talking only about "verbal" definitions.
However, it is obvious that ostensive definitions serve
only to fix (or determine) reference and not to give meaning.
In these definitions, no other expression is being offered
which could be taken to be synonymous with the expression
being defined.
Also, it might be useful to mention that there is a
fairly natural way of interpreting "fixing the mearling lll or
"giving the meaning" in which someone might feel that defirli-
tions which were claimed above only to fix the reference of
an expression actually do "fix" or "give", its meaning. Sirlce
0nce someone is told to what some proper name refers, that
person will then be able to use the name correctly, he will
understand it. So, in the sense that some person who didn't
understand how to use an expression acquires this ability
once he is given the definition, the definition has "giverl"
the meaning (or use) of the expression to the person.
llActually the name "Aristotle" was probably introduced
with a verbal definition. At some pOiIlt, sorneorle or sante
linguistic conununity probably stipulated that "Aristotle"
is to have the same reference as .. an , where "8" is tIle name,
in some other language, of Aristotle.
12 · k · d · 27 28Kr1p e, Nam1ng an Necess1ty, pp. - .
13I~ · d 83D~ ., p. .
14 f h· · · · 1 fo course, t 1S 15 Just a spec~a case 0 a more
general phenomenon. If I already know somethirlg, I would flot
seem to have any reaSOll for askirlg how I could f irld it out.
15 · k· · R 1 d p. t IS.A. Kr1p e, W1ttgenste1n on u es an rlva e ~ang-
uage, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982).
16W•V • O• Quine, Word and Object, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press, 1960), Chapter 2, pp. 26-80.
17H. Putnam, Reason, Truth arld History, (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1982).
H. Putnam, "Realism and Reason," irl MeaniIlg anJ. the
Moral Sciences, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978),
pp • 121-14 0 •
185
18H. Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, pp. 32-38,
pp. 217-218.
19I have only given a very general statement of what
Putnam actually argues. I haven't explained what lIoperatioIlal
and theoretical" oonstraints are arld why Putnam feels that
they are the only correct ways of narrowing down ~he set of
admissible interpretations. However, it is unimportant for
the purposes of this paper to get into these matters.
20This is a little too strong to be justified by the
actual examples discussed by Kripke and Quine. At best, they
show that meaning something by "plus" and "gavagai" are
problematic. In defense of (22), Kripke does, in his book
(pages 19-30), show how a skeptical paradox could be developed
for other expressions ill the laI19.-Uage. Indeed, once one sees
the kinds of hypotheses that the skeptic is willing to defend,
it is hard to imagine how allY expression could be e=-cempt from
his att:i.ck.
21Actua1ly, while Kr1"pke and Putnam both state that
they don't think that these "skeptical" arguments show ttlat
meaning and reference are impossible, Quine is somewhat less
clear. He says that meaning and reference just are "indeter-
minate," and there is no "fact of the matter" as to whether
"gavagai" is to be translated as "rabbit ll or as nur~detached
rabbit parts." However, it isn't important ill this COlltext
to clarify Quine's remarks further.
22H • Putnam, "Realism and Reason," pp. 126-127.
23H• Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, pp. 45-46.
24 Of course, by expressioI1S "like" (26) , I ~
mean that "grass is green" in (26) is to be replaced by other
English sentences.
25H. Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, pp. 1-2.
26 b·d 2I ~ ., p ••
27H • Field, "Tarski's Theory of Truth," The Journal of
Philosophy, 69, (1972), pp. 362-363.
28 Ibid., pp. 366-367.
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Interestingly, Field would not accept the actual tlleory
or "picture" of reference that Kripke proposes. As Kripke
himself admits, that theory presupposes the notioll of "inten-
ding to refer, II and hence, does not completely elimirlate the
concept of reference in 'favor of the concepts of physics.
29H• Putnam, "Meaning and Knowledge (The John Locke
Lectures, 1976)," in Mearling and the Moral Sciences, (Lorldon:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 16.
30 Ibid., p. 17.
31In Section II of this paper, I pointed out that we
sometimes offer analyses of particular terms in order to teach
people who don I t already ullderstarld those terms how to use
them correctly. For this purpose, the Tarski style definition
of reference offered by sentences like (T) would seem to be
adequate. After all, that analysis does give us a way of
eliminating the term "refers. 1I
32For example, Kripke-l s causal analysis could not be
used for the purpose of teaching someone who didn't understand
the term urefers" how to use that term correetly. To see
this, consider what Kripke says about his th~ury OIl pages
96-97 of Naming and Necessity.
A rough statement of a theory might be the
following: An initial "baptism" takes place.
Here the object may be named by ostension, or
the refe~ence of the name may be fixed by a
description. Wherl the name is I passed from
link to link,' the receiver of the name must,
I ~hink intend when he learns it to use it
with the same referent as the man from whom
he heard it. If I hear the name 'NapoleoTl'
and decide it would be a nice Ilame for my
pet aardvark, I do not satisfy this corldi tion.
(Perhaps it is some such failure to keep
reference fixed which accounts for the diver-
gence of present uses of "Sant.a Claus II, from
the alleged original use.)
Notice that the preceding outline hardly
eliminates the notion of refererlcei on the
contrary, it takes the Ilotion of irl tending
to use the same reference as a giverl.
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Thus Kripke admits that the notion of a "causal
chain" employed in his theory depends upon the notion of
intending to refer to the same thing as the person from
whom one originally got the name. So, if the causal analysis
of Kripke were to be written out completely, the expression
"refer ll would appear on both sides of the biconditional.
Since this definition or analysis would be circular, it
could not be used to teach someone what "refers" means.
33H• Putnam, "Meaning and Knowledge (The John Locke
Lectures, 1976)," p. 58.
